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Employee Mobility and The Low Wage
Worker: The Illegitimate Use of Non-Compete
Agreements
JACQUELINE A. CAROSA, ESQ.†
INTRODUCTION
Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are contracts made
between an employer and employee that restrict the
employee’s postemployment opportunities.1 These restraints
on trade limit an employee’s ability to take a position with a
competitor, or start a competing business,2 within a defined
geographic area for a defined period of time.3 NCAs provide
an employer the assurance that trade secrets, confidential
information, client relationships, or a former employee’s
unique skills will not be unfairly used to benefit a

†This

Paper was researched and written while the author was a student at the
University at Buffalo School of Law. She served as a Note and Comment Editor
of The Buffalo Law Review, graduated cum laude in 2019, and was admitted to
the practice of law in New York and New Jersey in 2019.
The author thanks University at Buffalo School of Law Professor Lise Gelernter
for her help with organizing and editing the content of this Paper.
1. Vanessa Maire Griffith, Non-Compete Agreements with Employees,
Practical Law Practice Note 7-501-3409, Westlaw (last visited Nov. 11, 2018)
[hereinafter Griffith Practice Note].
2. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 839 (2013) [hereinafter Driving
Performance].
3. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1.
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competitor.4
Nearly one in five workers in the United States is
employed under an NCA, with greater prevalence in more
highly skilled sectors5 where trade secrets, confidential
client information, and highly specialized skills are common.
However, NCAs have found their way into the low wage
sector where there is no legally recognized legitimate
business interest to protect. In fact, approximately 12% of
earners who do not have a bachelor’s degree and make up to
$40,000.00 a year have signed NCAs.6
The public backlash against the use of NCAs for low
wage workers has led to much discussion and many articles
about why they should or should not be banned or regulated.

4. Id.; Rita Zeidner, Rethinking Non-compete Agreements, HR MAG., Dec.
2017/Jan. 2018, at 67, https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P4-1975979529/
rethinking-noncompete-agreements [hereinafter “Rethinking Non-compete
Agreements”].
5. Evan Starr et al., Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force 14 (U.Mich. Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714 [hereinafter Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor
Force] (18.1% of the U.S. labor force). This Paper relies heavily on the work of
Evan Starr, an assistant professor at the University of Maryland Robert H. Smith
School of Business. Prof. Starr has written and co-written a dozen scholarly
papers on the use, enforceability, and effects of non-competes, six of which have
been published at the time this Paper was originally submitted, and his work has
been cited in U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%
20Non-competes%20Report.pdf [hereinafter OEP REPORT], and WHITE HOUSE
REPORT, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES,
AND STATE RESPONSES,
6 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE
REPORT]. Post-submission, Starr co-wrote Low-Wage Workers and the
Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements with Michael Lipsitz (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452240.
The authors
examined the effects of the 2008 ban against non-compete agreements for hourly
and low-wage workers in the State of Oregon and concluded that the ban resulted
in higher hourly wages on average, increased job mobility, increased the
proportion of salaried worker, decreased the likelihood of being unemployed,
without affecting hours worked. Id. at 26.
6. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3.
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Jimmy John’s made the headlines and received a great deal
of negative press when it came to light that their franchisees
were requiring sandwich makers and delivery drivers to sign
NCAs.7 The NCAs prevented departing employees from
performing services for any company deriving “more than ten
percent (10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, herotype, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches”
for a postemployment period of two years.8 The NCAs
covered a geographic area of between two and three miles “of
either [the Jimmy John’s location in question] or any such
other Jimmy John’s Sandwich Shop.”9 Investigations and
lawsuits by the New York and Illinois State Attorneys
General offices led the company to settle the suits and agree
to halt the practice.10
E-commerce giant Amazon received sharp criticism for
requiring its hourly employees, including warehouse and
seasonal workers, to sign NCAs.11 The NCAs were extremely
broad in scope and stated that the employee could not:
directly or indirectly . . . engage in or support the development,
manufacture, marketing, or sale of any product or service that
competes or is intended to compete with any product or service sold,

7. Sarah Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses Following
Settlement, CNBC, (June 22, 2016, 1:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-drops-non-compete-clauses-following-settlement.html
[hereinafter Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses].
8. Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign
‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFPOST, (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:03 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_
5978180.html?1413230622 [hereinafter Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete
Agreements].
9. Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7;
Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8.
10. Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7;
Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8.
11. Jana Kasperkevic, Amazon Removes Crazy Non-compete From Hourly
Worker’s Contracts, BUS. INSIDER, (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:42 AM),
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-removes-non-compete-clause-for-hourlyworkers-2015-3.

D4

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon (or intended to be sold,
offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon in the future) that
employee worked on or supported, or about which employee
obtained or received Confidential Information. 12

Aside from requiring the gift of clairvoyance, the
restraint theoretically prevented employment at companies
that were not direct competitors of Amazon. The NCA’s reach
was so vast that the ordinary employee would find it difficult
to avoid breaching the contract. Indeed, the contract states
that the employee “recognizes that the geographic areas for
many of Amazon’s products and services . . . are extremely
broad and in many cases worldwide.”13 Given the breadth of
Amazon’s products and services, the scope of the limitation
was potentially devastating to the livelihood of its employees.
Ultimately, due to the negative publicity, Amazon agreed to
stop the practice for its hourly employees.14
In addition to sandwich makers and warehouse workers,
NCAs have also been used to tie other low wage workers to
their jobs, such as labor hands,15 hairdressers, camp
counsellors,16 and residential and commercial cleaners.17 The
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Lauren C. Williams, Amazon Gets Rid of Strict Non-Compete Clause for
Contract and Temporary Employees, THINKPROGRESS, (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:15 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/amazon-gets-rid-of-strict-non-compete-clause-forcontract-and-temporary-employees-f7b12b94cfa9/.
15. Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N.Y.
TIMES, (May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/
noncompete-clauses.html [hereinafter How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers
Locked In].
16. Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/
business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html?_r=0.
17. Danny Westneat, $15-an-hour Job Comes With Noncompete Clause,
Threat of Legal Action, SEATTLE TIMES, (Nov. 11, 2014, 8:30 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/15-an-hour-job-comes-withnoncompete-clause-threat-of-legal-action/ (discussing the circumstances in which
an employee of ServiceMaster Seattle found himself when he took a job with a
rival company to make $3 more an hour).
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use of NCAs has gone beyond protecting businesses from
unfair competition. They are now used to control employee
turnover and manipulate free markets by limiting fair
competition.
Focusing on the low wage sector, this paper discusses the
pros and cons of using NCAs and argues that the benefits of
banning NCAs outweigh the possible harm enough to justify
legislation. Part I discusses the at-will employment
relationship, the history of NCAs, and legally protectable
legitimate business interests. Part II discusses the
regulation of NCAs and includes a description of current
state law and judicial interpretations.
Part III presents the incidence, benefits, and costs
associated with the use of NCAs. The studies and statistics
show that there is much to gain for both employer and
employee in banning NCAs for low wage workers, but it is
not without potential cost to the employer and possible
detriment to the low wage employee.18 Nevertheless, because
NCAs are intended to prevent unfair competition and protect
legitimate business interests, it begs the question: Are low
wage workers in a position to compete unfairly if they do not
possess unique skills or have access to trade secrets and
confidential information?
Part IV discusses recent litigation and legislative
initiatives, includes a summary of reasons why NCAs should
be banned in the low wage sector, and presents this author’s
conclusion that such action is justified because there is no
recognized legitimate business interest to protect. Further,
the benefits of banning NCAs in the low wage sector
outweigh the harm so dramatically that states should
continue to consider bills banning NCAs for low wage
workers and imposing restrictions on and requirements for

18. OEP REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4; Evan Starr, Consider This: Training,
Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV.
783, 785–86 (2019).
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the use of NCAs for all other workers. This paper touches on
several current and proposed federal and state initiatives.
However, to provide a legitimate basis to propose legislation
in my home state of New York, this paper focuses primarily
on current and proposed initiatives in New York. Because
recent legislative efforts have failed in my state, Part IV
includes a piece of proposed legislation for New York State,
which is combination of the recently passed Massachusetts
legislation and bills previously introduced in the New York
State Assembly and Senate.
I.

THE HISTORY OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

A. At-Will Employment
Most states in the United States are at-will employment
states.19 At-will employment means that both employer and
employee have the right to terminate the employment
relationship at any time, for any reason, without notice.20
This “right” can produce harsh results to both parties when
the relationship is terminated without cause or notice. “The
original purposes of the employment at-will doctrine were to
afford employees the freedom to contract to suit their needs
and to allow employers to exercise their best judgment
regarding staffing matters.”21 Notwithstanding its
harshness, the at-will rule gives businesses autonomy over
hiring practices and promotes employee mobility.
Today, the average person changes jobs an average of 12
19. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, NCSL, At-Will Employment – Overview,
NCSL.ORG (Apr. 15, 2008) http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/
at-will-employment-overview.aspx [hereinafter NCSL].
20. Id. This assumes the employee is not part of a legally-protected class, or
that the termination circumstances do not violate a law or regulation.
21. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 (1987); see also NCSL,
supra note 19 (“Some reasons given for our retention of the at-will presumption
include respect for freedom of contract, employer deference, and the belief that
both employers and employees favor an at-will employment relationship over job
security.”).
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times during his or her career.22 Having the flexibility to
make career moves encourages workers to find the best
possible employment fit and gives employers a large pool
from which to recruit the best possible employees for their
business. It follows, then, that an employee needs a way out
of an entry-level job in order to keep his or her career moving
forward and upward. At-will employment is a reciprocal
right that promotes both of those goals.
The most clear-cut exception to the presumption of atwill employment is a written employment contract
demonstrating the parties’ intent to modify the at-will
relationship. For example, employment contract terms can
be tailored to require progressive discipline prior to
termination, termination for good cause, 30 or more daysnotice prior to termination, and so on. In addition to written
contracts signed by the parties, an employer with an express
written policy modifying the at-will rule - such as a rule
contained in an employee handbook - may well be bound by
the policy’s representations in the absence of a clear
disclaimer if the employer induces reliance on the policy.23
If a legally valid contract modifies the at-will rule, it will be
viewed as the best representation of the parties’ intent.24
Having the flexibility to come and go at will leaves open
the possibility that the employee will re-enter the job market

22. Alison Doyle, How Often Do People Change Jobs?, BALANCE CAREERS,
(updated Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/how-often-dopeople-change-jobs-2060467; see also Scott Marker, How Many Jobs Will the
Average Person Have in His or Her Lifetime?, LINKEDIN, (Feb. 22, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-many-jobs-average-person-have-his-herlifetime-scott-marker (reporting 12-15 jobs according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
23. NCSL, supra note 19; Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co., 96 N.Y.2d 312, 316
(2001). Note that “routinely issued employee manuals, handbooks, and policy
statements should not lightly be converted into binding employment
agreements.” Id. at 317.
24. Goldman v. White Plains Ctr. for Nursing Care, LLC, 11 N.Y.3d 173, 176
(2008).
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as a direct competitor of the former employer. Without a
contract to the contrary, the employee is free to secure
employment to best suit his or her needs. The line separating
fair competition from unfair competition is crossed when a
former employee absconds with trade secrets, client lists, key
employees, or confidential information. Reasonable
safeguards against unfair competition should be in place to
protect businesses, business owners, and their employees
from losses that result from unfair competition. Restrictive
covenants—non-compete, non-disclosure, and non-solicit
agreements—have been used to mitigate those losses.
B. The Rise and Evolution of Non-Compete Agreements
NCAs are a vehicle by which an employer can limit an
employee’s prospective employment opportunities.25 Their
use has been traced back to the 1400’s when craftsmen tried
to prevent their apprentices from starting a competing
business in the same locale.26 At that time, courts refused to
enforce NCAs, in favor of free movement in the labor
market.27 The English court case of Mitchel v. Reynolds is
credited with marking the shift toward judicial acceptance of
the reasonableness of partial restraints on trade.28 Mitchel
leased a bakery from Reynolds for five years. The parties
entered into an agreement, upon consideration, that should
Reynolds compete with Mitchel’s bakery during the term of

25. MARION G. CRAIN, ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 303 (3d ed.
2015); Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1.
26. Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture,
20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 504 (2016); W. Andrew Arnold, Non-Compete
History, SC NONCOMPETE LAWYER, http://www.scnoncompetelawyer.com/shorthistory-of-non-competes/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
27. Arnold, supra, note 26.
28. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Queens’ Bench 1711). Mitchel v. Reynolds has also been
cited by the dissent in United States Supreme Court as the “standard for testing
the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to a
legitimate transaction, such as an employment contract . . . .” Bus. Elec. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the parties’ five-year lease, Reynolds would have to pay
Mitchel on a bond for 50 pounds. Reynolds breached, Mitchel
sued, and Reynolds countered that the restraint on his trade
was unlawful. The court held that the contract was valid as
a reasonable restraint on trade because it was limited in time
and geographic scope and was necessary to protect Mitchel’s
business.29
In an effort to prevent unfair competition, NCAs have
traditionally been used to protect legitimate business
interests such as: 1. trade secrets or confidential information;
2. customer relationships; 3. investment in the employee’s
reputation in the market; and 4. purchase of a business
owned by the employee.30 However, as industrial and global
economies evolved, so too have employer motivations for
using NCAs. In addition to preventing unfair competition,
NCAs are now used to reduce the costs of employee
turnover,31 increase the cost of competition,32 control free
markets,33 and depress wage growth.34
NCAs may have seemed less necessary in the age of
lifelong,
stable
employment
relationships,
where
compensation packages were attractive enough to create a
loyal workforce. Employers like Eastman Kodak, General
Motors, Xerox, and Wegmans boast some of the lowest rates

29. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep at 352; Arnold, supra note 26.
30. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 8.07(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
31. OEP Report supra note 5, at 3.
32. Id. at 4.
33. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15
(explaining non-competes are used to “prevent the forces of competition”). Such a
restraint would be unenforceable on public policy grounds if it is unreasonably
“determinantal to the smooth operation of a freely competitive private economy.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 comment (a), (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
34. Consider This, supra note 18, at 18, 19, 24, 25.
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of turnover.35 Low turnover employers enjoy not only better
employee morale and higher productivity, but need to spend
much less on training and recruitment than their highturnover counterparts.36 However, the numbers show that
lifelong employment is not the norm, resulting in increased
costs related to employee turnover and training.37
The costs associated with employee turnover vary from
business to business, but the cost may be as much as twice
the employee’s annual salary, especially for those at the
higher end of the compensation spectrum.38 A study by the
Society for Human Resource Management estimates that six
to nine months of an employee’s earnings are spent finding
and hiring a replacement.39 A study by the Center for
American Progress (CAP) found that the cost to replace a
$10/hour employee would be $3,328.00, or 16% of the
employee’s annual earnings.40 For employees earning
between $30-50,000.00, the cost rises to 20%.41 These
replacement costs typically include the costs of hiring,
onboarding, and lost productivity.42 Notwithstanding the
35. Vivian Giang, A New Report Ranks America’s Biggest Companies Based
on How Quickly Employee Jump Ship, BUSINESS INSIDER, (July 25, 2013, 8:41
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-ranked-by-turnover-rates2013-7; Max Nisen, Wegmans is a Great Grocery Store Because it’s a Great
Employer, QUARTZ, (May 13, 2015), https://qz.com/404063/new-york-city-isgetting-a-great-grocery-store-in-wegmans-and-an-even-better-employer/.
36. Christina Merhar, Employee Retention—The Real Cost of Losing an
Employee, PEOPLE KEEP, (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/
bid/312123/employee-retention-the-real-cost-of-losing-an-employee [hereinafter
“Employee Retention”].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Julie Kantor, High Turnover Costs Way More Than You Think,
HUFFPOST, (updated Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/juliekantor/high-turnover-costs-way-more-than-you-think_b_9197238.html.
40. Employee Retention, supra note 36.
41. Id.
42. Id. The 2014 Training Industry Report from Training Magazine sets the
annual training budgets for small businesses at $1,200.00 per employee. Tess C.
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high cost of turnover, most companies do not know how much
turnover costs their company and don’t even try to figure it
out.43
Controlling turnover and limiting postemployment
opportunities has the effect of maintaining a stable
workforce, thus reducing turnover and the costs associated
with it.44 However, controlling turnover is not recognized by
most courts in the United States as a protectable legitimate
business interest that would justify the use of NCAs.45
Without a judicially recognized protectable business interest,
the use of NCAs is neither legitimate nor in good faith under
current law. In fact, the recent phenomenon of using NCAs
to tie low wage workers to a job has even been described as a
form of modern-day slavery and violative of Thirteenth
Amendment rights against involuntary servitude.46
II. HOW NON-COMPETES HAVE BEEN REGULATED
A. Antitrust Laws and Regulation at the Federal Level

Taylor, The Costs of Training New Employees, Including Hidden Expenses,
FORBES, (June 2, 2017, 5:09 PM)), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2017/06/02/
the-costs-of-training-new-employees-including-hidden-expenses/#6f6be1bbafb2.
43. Jack Altman, How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?,
HUFFPOST, (updated Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
how-much-does-employee-turnover-really-cost_us_587fbaf9e4b0474ad4874fb7
[hereinafter How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?].
44. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 10.
45. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93. In fact, a review of Russell Beck’s
Employee Noncompetes, A State by State Survey does not indicate a single state
that recognizes controlling turnover as a legitimate business interest, although
AL, AK, AR, CO, DC, FL, GA, IN, KS, KY, LA, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, VT recognize
some investments in training. Russell Beck, Beck, Reed Riden LLP, Employee
Noncompetes, A State By State Survey, FAIR COMPETITION LAW (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/2019/10/21/50-state-noncompete-chartupdated-october-2019-fl-me-md-nh-or-ri-wa/ [hereinafter Beck’s State By State
Survey].
46. See, e.g., Ayesha Bell Hardaway, The Paradox of the Right to Contract:
Non-compete Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations, 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 957 (2016).
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There is no current federal law that prohibits or places
restrictions on the use of NCAs. However, there have been
efforts to use antitrust laws to defeat the enforceability of
NCAs, though they have not been widely accepted. For
example, Jonathan Pollard, a Florida attorney specializing
in litigating complex non-compete, trade secret, trademark
and unfair competition cases, believes that “virtually all noncompete agreements [are] illegal restraints on trade” 47 and
that the agreements should be evaluated as restraints on
trade subject to antitrust scrutiny.48 He has tried to use
Florida state antitrust law to defeat enforceability, but finds
that antitrust arguments have not gained traction in Florida
state trial courts. Pollard asserts that “the vast majority of
judges are completely unfamiliar with the antitrust
principles that underlie Florida law” and “simply do not
understand the law’s origins.”49 Indeed, in response to
Pollard’s antitrust arguments, one federal judge stated: “You
might have something with this antitrust but I don’t know.”50
In Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross,51 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had this to say
about the use of the Sherman Act52 in non-compete cases:
In affirming the district court, we need not pass upon the general
applicability of the federal antitrust laws to postemployment
restraints. Although such issues have not often been raised in the
federal courts, employee agreements not to compete are proper

47. Jonathan Pollard, Non-Compete News & Notes—August 2018, THE NONCOMPETE BLOG, (Aug. 24, 2018) https://thenoncompeteblog.com/2018/08/24/
non-compete-news-notes-august-2018/.
48. Jonathan Pollard, 9th Circuit: Non-Competes Subject to Antitrust
Analysis, THE NON-COMPETE BLOG, (Apr. 2, 2017), https://thenoncompete
blog.com/2017/04/02/9th-circuit-non-competes-subject-to-antitrust-analysis/.
49. Jonathan Pollard, Monopolists & Non-Compete Agreements, THE NONCOMPETE BLOG, (Apr. 6, 2017), https://thenoncompeteblog.com/2017/04/06/
monopolists-non-compete-agreements/.
50. Id.
51. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
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subjects for scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. When a
company interferes with free competition for one of its former
employee’s services, the market’s ability to achieve the most
economically efficient allocation of labor is impaired.53

Moreover, employee-noncompetition clauses can tie up
industry expertise and experience and thereby forestall new
entry.
The
Court
explained
that
“[r]estraints
on
postemployment competition that serve no legitimate
purpose at the time they are adopted would be per se invalid”
under the Sherman Act and that “even if the clause is not
overbroad per se, it might still be scrutinized for
unreasonableness… Restraints that fail this balancing test
might be struck down under a rule of reason.”54 However, the
balancing test can be difficult for courts to administer and
lead to inconsistent results. The complex nature of this
judicial analysis has been recently criticized by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC).
In his Comment on Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century, Federal Trade Commissioner
Rohit Chopra provides an illustrative and informative
discussion on the role of the FTC in promoting fair
competition and the current state of antitrust law.55 He
explains that antitrust law today is “developed exclusively
through adjudication,” which requires judges to perform
analyses that call for speculation and the application of
“complex antitrust standards” that are difficult to
administer.56 This yields unpredictable and inconsistent

53. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 627 (1960).
54. Newburger, 563 F.2d at 1082.
55. See Comment of Rohit Chopra, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Docket ID FTC-20180074 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf.
56. Id. at 2.
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results.57 In addition, antitrust litigation is “protracted and
expensive, requiring extensive and costly expert
analysis,”58and “lacks adequate democratic participation”59
because “broad swaths of market participants” are left on the
sidelines.60
To address these shortcomings, Chopra suggests that
FTC rulemaking (1) allows the FTC to provide clear notice to
market
participants
that
respects
due
process
considerations; (2) helps alleviate issues tied to adjudication,
such as the protracted and costly nature of a legal remedy;
and (3) facilitates a process that gives the public a voice and
mechanism by which to be heard before any rule is issued.61
To support FTC rulemaking, Chopra posits that there are
“areas where private litigation is unlikely to discipline
anticompetitive conduct” and he uses the example of NCAs
to make his point.62 The Commissioner argues:
In theory, workers could bring a lawsuit alleging that certain
noncompete clauses are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. In
practice, however, private litigation in this area is effectively
nonexistent . . . Any
challenges
must
be
pursued
in
isolation . . . . Given the paucity of private litigation challenging
noncompete agreements as antitrust violations, the FTC might
consider engaging in rulemaking on this issue. A rule could remove
any ambiguity as to when noncompete agreements are permissible
or not. Pursuing this through rulemaking might be far speedier—
and fair—than engaging in enforcement activities.”63

Chopra concludes that “the status quo suffers from
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5. Chopra explains that this would advance Congress’ intention that
the FTC collect data regarding business practices from market participants, use
the data to identify market trends, and “establish market-wide standards
clarifying what practices constitute[] an “unfair method of competition.”
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
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ambiguity, resource burden, and a deficit of democratic
participation”64 and “urge[s] interested parties to explore
whether and how rulemaking might lead to antitrust policy
that is more predictable, efficient, and participatory.”65 FTC
rulemaking may, in the future, have favorable results for
employees and provide much needed guidance to employers.
In the meantime, the bulk of NCA regulation has been left to
the states.
B. States as Regulators
Like most contract issues, NCAs have largely been left
to the states to regulate.66 The employment relationship is
fundamentally contractual because employment terms are
fixed by an agreement between the parties.67 Because
contract law rules apply, the agreement must be supported
by adequate consideration.68 In most states, the offer of atwill employment is sufficient consideration for an
enforceable contract,69 but some states require additional
consideration.70 Depending on the state, additional
consideration might be a promise to provide confidential
information or specialized training, stock options, or garden
leave.71 A garden leave provision is an agreement that an
employer will continue to pay an employee after termination
of the employment relationship so long as the employee

64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 11.
66. J.J. Prescott, et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014
Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 393 (2016).
67. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 379, 380 (Dec. 2016).
68. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; Angie Davis, et al., Developing Trends in Non-Compete Agreements
and Other Restrictive Covenants, 30 A.B.A J. LAB. & EMP. L. 255, 267 (2015).
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provides notice of termination in accordance with the agreed
upon terms and refrains from working for a competitor
during the payment period.72 Additional consideration is one
tool that can be used to attract candidates to open positions
and provide compensation for forfeited postemployment
opportunities.
To protect employees from the harsh results of limited
postemployment opportunities, some states have passed a
variety of legislation limiting or prohibiting the use of
NCAs.73 For example, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New York and Washington have laws restricting use of NCAs
in the broadcast industry.74 Connecticut prohibits the use of
NCAs for security guards.75 Tennessee and New Mexico are
two states that have placed restrictions on the use of NCAs
for health care providers.76 Laws in New Hampshire require
disclosures of NCAs prior to acceptance of an offer of
employment, while Oregon requires disclosure at least two
weeks before the first day of employment.77 Laws in North
Dakota and Montana prohibit the use of NCAs except in
regard to the sale or dissolution of a business.78
There has also been some successful recent state
legislation limiting non-compete use. For example, Illinois
successfully passed legislation banning the use of NCAs for
low wage earners. The Freedom to Work Act applies to NCAs
entered into on or after Jan. 1, 2017 and prohibits private
employers for entering into NCAs with low wage workers
72. Davis, et al, supra note 71, at 267.
73. For a summary of the current law in each state, see Non-Compete
Agreements, 0060 SURVEYS 23, 50 State Statutory Surveys: Employment:
Private Employment, (Nov. 2017) Westlaw; see also Beck’s State By State Survey,
supra note 48.
74. Non-Compete Agreements, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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making less than $13 per hour or minimum wage, whichever
is greater.79
On October 1, 2018, the Massachusetts Noncompetition
Agreement Act went into effect, placing limitations and
requirements on the use of NCAs, including prohibiting the
agreements for employees classified as nonexempt under the
Fair Labor Standards Act,80 undergraduate or graduate
student internships, employees laid off or fired without cause
and employees under 18 years of age.81 There is no specific
prohibition for low wage workers, but there is a requirement
that a NCA be supported by garden-leave or other agreed
upon consideration.82

79. Illinois General Assembly, Illinois Compiled Statutes, Illinois Freedom to
Work Act (820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 90/1), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3737&ChapterID=68.
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1)–(19) (2012) delineate the classes of employees that
are exempt from the protections under the FLSA, such as, for example, “any
employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity,” or “in the capacity of outside salesman,” or “any employee employed in
connection with the publication of any . . . newspaper” with a limited circulation.
Most employees are non-exempt and are entitled to paid overtime. Employees
paid less than $23,600.00 per year, hourly employees, and employees that do not
work in the areas delineated under the FLSA are non-exempt.
81. MGL
c.149,
§ 24L,
(added
by
St.
2018,
c.228,
§ 21)
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2018/Chapter228; Erik J.
Winton and Colin A. Thakkar, Massachusetts Legislature (Finally) Passes NonCompete Law, (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/
massachusetts-legislature-finally-passes-non-compete-law; see also Melissa L.
McDonagh and Kevin E. Burke, Massachusetts Legislature Passes
Comprehensive Noncompete Reform, (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.littler.com/
publication-press/publication/massachusetts-legislature-passes-comprehensivenoncompete-reform. Massachusetts also has laws prohibiting the use of noncompete agreements for certain professions. See https://www.mass.gov/infodetails/massachusetts-law-about-noncompetition-agreements.
82. MGL
c.149,
§ 24L,
(added
by
St.
2018,
c.228,
§ 21)
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2018/Chapter228; See also
Beck, Reed, Riden, LLP, Massachusetts Noncompete and Trade Secret Reform
Has Arrived: What You Need to Know, FAIR COMPETITION LAW, (Aug.1,
2018), https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/2018/08/01/massachusettsnoncompete-and-trade-secret-reform-has-arrived-what-you-need-to-know/.
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C. General Trends and Judicial Doctrines
In addition to a variety of state-specific legislative
approaches to the issue, state courts have adopted their own
state-specific interpretations of the law on NCAs. For
example, some states are “high enforcing” states, which
means the courts in the state are more likely to enforce the
NCA, and others are “low” or “nonenforcing” states.83 Some
courts will reform an unreasonable contract and others will
find it unenforceable or void.84
The judicial decision to enforce an agreement that
contains an unreasonable covenant depends on which
doctrine the state court has adopted. Courts have three
options when dealing with terms they deem unreasonable:
(1) throw the entire contract out, including reasonable terms
and provisions (red-pencil rule); (2) strike out only the
offensive provisions of the contract (blue-pencil rule); or (3)
reform the contract to make the terms reasonable85 (the
reformation or “purple-rule” doctrine).86 While the red-pencil
rule is a harsh remedy, it would encourage employers to draft
only reasonable agreements for fear that the entire contract
would be voided if any part is found invalid. The other rules
do not serve to discourage employers from including
unreasonable terms in an NCA, but they ensure employer

83. Consider This, supra note 18, at 9-10, 51, 53. For example, Florida,
Kansas, and Connecticut are considered high enforcement states while
California, North Dakota, and New York are considered low enforcement states.
84. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45 (providing a comprehensive
list of states and the applicable restrictions).
85. Andrew P. Torrez, Of Red and Blue Pencils: Three Ways in Which States
Can Respond to Defective Noncompete Clauses, (May 1, 2014),
https://www.zuckerman.com/news/blog/red-and-blue-pencils-three-ways-whichstates-can-respond-defective-noncompete-clauses.
86. Hannesson Murphy, How the 50 States Differ on Revising Non-Competes:
Different Strokes for Different Folks (or Red, Blue and Purple-Pencil America),
(Jan. 5, 2014), THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/how-50-states-differ-revising-non-competes-different-strokes-differentfolks-or-red-.
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protection in cases where an NCA has been poorly drafted.
More than 30 states have adopted the practice of contract
reformation, including Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, and Tennessee.87 About a dozen states strike out the
unreasonable provisions while leaving the remainder of the
contract intact, under the blue-pencil rule, while the redpencil rule remains largely unapplied by state courts.88
An employee can challenge the validity and
enforceability of an NCA and there are a variety of causes of
action available to do so. For example, courts may consider
various claims such as tortious interference,89 intentional
infliction of emotional distress, breach by the employer,
fraudulent misrepresentation, unconscionability, bad faith,
duress, lack of capacity, or coercion.90 While employees do
have causes of action available to them, many lack the
resources to fund a lawsuit.
D. The New York Example
With each state taking its own unique approach to
NCAs, it may be helpful to take a closer look at how one state
has attacked the issue. Since it is my intention to present a
proposed bill for New York State, the following is a picture of
the existing state of non-compete law in New York.
Currently, New York State has taken limited steps to
restrict the use of NCAs. New York Labor Law Sec. 202-k
prohibits the use of NCAs for employees in the broadcast
industry,91 but legislation was proposed in the 2017 session
to amend Section 202-k to allow the agreements for “key”
87. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45.
88. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45.
89. NBT Bancorp, Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 614,
621 (1996).
90. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1. This is not an exhaustive list of
available defenses.
91. N.Y. Lab. Law § 202-k (McKinney 2019).

D20

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

employees in the industry.92 There is currently no state law
that prohibits the use of NCAs in the low wage sector.
In New York courts, NCAs “are not favored and thus are
strictly construed”93 because of the “powerful considerations
of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of
a [person’s] livelihood.”94 Indeed, courts in the State are at
the lowest end of the enforcement spectrum out-ranked only
by California and North Dakota.95 New York courts have
ruled against enforceability of terms that are onerous 96 or
overbroad,97 but they have not considered the specific issue
of the enforceability of a non-compete against a low wage
earner.
BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg is the often-cited New York
Court of Appeals case on the standards of enforcing NCAs in
New York.98 In BDO, the Defendant was employed by the
Plaintiff as an accountant and was required to sign an NCA
as a condition of promotion.99 The NCA contained a provision
requiring the Defendant to pay BDO “1 ½ times the last
annual billing for any such client” in the event that the
Defendant provided services for any BDO client within 18
months of termination of employment.100 Approximately four

92. A5102/S521 would amend 202-k to allow non-competes for employees
making $250,000.00 or more from an employer licensed in a city with a
population in excess of 1 million, or an employee making $100,000.00 or more
from an employer licensed in a city with a population of less than 1 million.
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=+a5102.
93. Goodman v. N.Y. Oncology Hematology, P.C., 101 A.D.3d 1524, 1526 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012).
94. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, 25 N.Y.3d 364, 370 (2015), (quoting
Gramercy Park Animal Ctr. v. Novick, 41 N.Y.2d 874, 874).
95. Consider This, supra note 18, at 51.
96. Goodman, 101 A.D.3d at 1528.
97. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388 (1999).
98. Id. at 382.
99. Id. at 387.
100. Id.
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months after signing the NCA, the Defendant resigned and
allegedly took with him 100 BDO clients.101 BDO attempted
to recover lost revenue pursuant to the NCA, but the
Defendant denied serving some of the clients and argued
that a “substantial number of them were personal clients he
had brought to the firm through his own outside contacts.”102
When the Defendant refused to pay the allegedly lost
revenue, BDO sued to recover under the contract.103
Referring to the standard of reasonableness for NCAs
announced in the English court case Mitchel v. Reynolds, the
Court of Appeals discussed the “modern, prevailing commonlaw standard of reasonableness in determining the validity
of employee agreements not to compete.”104 The Court
explained that an employment restraint is reasonable “only
if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the
legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose
undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to
the public.”105 Reasonableness “focuses on the particular
facts and circumstances” of each case.106 If a contract violates
any prong of the reasonableness test, it is rendered
invalid.107
New York courts require the employer to prove all three
prongs of the test before the burden shifts to the employee to
show that the restraint is overbroad or unnecessary.108
101. Id.
102. Id. at 388.
103. Id. at 387.
104. Id. at 388.
105. Id. at 388–89. These criteria are used by other courts as well, for example,
Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45.
106. BDO Seideman, 93 N.Y.2d at 390.
107. Id. at 388–89.
108. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, 25 N.Y.3d 364, 369–70 (2015). This case
points out the difference between the burden shift in New York and Florida, with
New York’s standard being the more employee-friendly of the two. The Court also
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Under the first prong, legitimate employer interests are
limited to: (1) protection from competition by a former
employee whose services are unique or extraordinary; (2)
protection against the misappropriation of trade secrets or
confidential customer lists; and (3) protection against
appropriating the goodwill of clients or customers.109
In BDO, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate
Division’s decision voiding the entire covenant and declining
partial enforcement and dismissed concerns that “employers
will use their superior bargaining position to impose
unreasonable anti-competitive restrictions, uninhibited by
the risk that a court will void the entire agreement.”110 The
Court rejected a per se rule invalidating an overbroad
agreement,111 adopting, instead, a case-by-case approach
focusing on the conduct of the employer in which partial
enforcement could be justified if the employer “demonstrates
an absence of overreaching, coercive use of dominant
bargaining power, or other anti-competitive misconduct, but
has in good faith sought to protect a legitimate business
interest, consistent with reasonable standards of fair
dealing.”112 The BDO Court held that the facts justified
partial enforcement, finding no coercion, a “general plan to
forestall competition,” or bad faith.113
found the agreement’s choice of Florida law as contrary to New York public policy
and unenforceable.
109. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93.
110. Id. at 394.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 395; see also Mister Softee, Inc. v. Tsirkos, 14 Civ. 1975 (LTS)(RLE),
2014 WL 2535114, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Under New York law, a court may
partially enforce an overly broad non-compete covenant if plaintiff sought to
protect a legitimate business interest . . . New York has rejected strict
divisibility, or “blue-pencil” requirement, instead embracing flexible partial
enforcement of restrictive covenants. However, a court should not attempt to
partially enforce a non-compete provision where its infirmities are so numerous
that the court would be required to rewrite the entire provision.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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The issue of employer bad faith resurfaced recently in
Long Is. Minimally Invasive Surgery, P.C. v. St. John’s
Episcopal Hosp., where the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Nassau
County Supreme Court decision to invalidate an employment
covenant rather than modify it.114 In St. John’s, an action
was commenced to recover damages for breach of an
employment contract.115 Plaintiff, a medical practice, and
Defendant, Dr. Andrade, entered into a three-year
employment contract that contained a non-compete clause
barring Andrade from performing any kind of surgery for two
years within 10 miles of any of Plaintiff’s offices and
affiliated hospitals.116 The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
that a 10-mile restriction was necessary to protect its
interests.117 Rather than modify the covenant, the lower
court opted to throw it out.118 The Appellate Court
acknowledged that courts have “given greater weight to the
interests of the employer”119 when considering contracts
between professionals, yet found the restriction
unreasonable and questioned the Plaintiff’s good faith in
attempting to enforce it.120 The court found that applying
“the factors set forth in BDO Seidman militates against
partial enforcement” where plaintiff failed to demonstrate
anticompetitive misconduct, was seeking to impose an
overbroad covenant and used its superior bargaining position
in refusing to negotiate terms while compelling the employee
to sign the contract.121
114. Long Is. Minimally Invasive Surgery, P.C. v. St. John’s Episcopal Hosp.,
164 A.D.3d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 576.
117. Id. at 577.
118. Id. at 578.
119. Id. at 577.
120. Id. at 578.
121. Id.
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The necessity of demonstrating a legitimate business
interest and reasonable postemployment limitations was
recently discussed in Hoffman v. Raftopol.122 The Plaintiff, a
dermatologist, moved for an injunction against a former
physician’s assistant (P.A.) for violating an NCA that
prohibited the P.A. from taking a position within 2 years
from termination in a 15 mile radius from Plaintiff’s office.123
The court considered use of NCAs in the health care
industry, but found “the more difficult question” to be
whether the restriction protects “the legitimate interest of
the employer.”124 Quoting from the New York Court of
Appeals case Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mgf., the court
acknowledged that NCAs will be enforced “only if reasonably
limited temporally and geographically, and then only to the
extent necessary to protect the employer from unfair
competition which stems from the employee’s use or disclosure
of trade secrets or confidential customer lists.”125 In Hoffman,
the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a legitimate interest in
preventing her former employee from working within a 15
mile radius of her office. Consequently, the Court limited
injunctive relief to enjoining the P.A. from soliciting
Plaintiff’s clients for 2 years.126
These 2018 cases did not involve low wage employees,
but they offer insight regarding the necessity of the employer
to act in good faith and demonstrate a legitimate interest in
preventing the employee’s competition. These cases
illustrate the uphill battle employers face in New York courts
and other low-enforcement states should they either try to
enforce an NCA against an employee who poses no risk of
122. 2018 NY Slip Op 50020(U), 58 Misc.3d 1209(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10,
2018).
123. Id. at *1–2.
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id. at *7, (quoting Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 42
N.Y.2d 496, 499 (1977)) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at *11.
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unfair competition or impose overreaching restrictions that
are not necessary to protect legitimate business interests.
For those who elect to challenge the validity of an NCA
in New York, the first line of offense is to attack the contract
itself by reading its plain language. Has the employee in fact
violated the terms of the contract or is the employer trying to
expand the scope or purposely misinterpret the terms? Is the
restrictive covenant reasonable in scope as to time and
geography or is it overreaching as in the Amazon and Jimmy
John’s cases? Is it unduly burdensome to the employee or
harmful to the public as in St. John’s and Hoffman? Is the
employer trying to protect a legitimate business interest or
merely preventing fair competition and reduce training
costs? Will enforcement create a bar to employment for the
employee or will the employee still be able to make a living
in his or her area of expertise? The terms of the NCA should
be no more restrictive than necessary to protect the
employer’s legitimate business interests from unfair
competition.
III. INCIDENCE, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NON-COMPETE
AGREEMENTS
A. Incidence of Non-Compete Use
The use of NCAs has flourished since the 1400’s.
Research conducted by Evan Starr, JJ Prescott, and Norman
Bishara (“Starr U.S. Labor Force Report”) suggests that
nearly one in five workers in the U.S. (18.1%) are employed
under NCAs.127 While more prevalent in certain high-skilled
occupations, NCAs are commonly found in many other
industries. The Starr U.S. Labor Force Report breaks down
the incidence of NCAs by occupation, annual earnings, and
education.128 The occupational analysis reveals the

127. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 14.
128. Id.
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percentage of employees in a given industry who have signed
an NCA: engineering and architectural (36%), computer and
mathematical (35%), business and financial (23%), and
managerial (30%). Yet even employees in occupations such
as office support (14%), food preparation (11%), production
(16%), and legal occupations (10%) sign NCAs.129
The annual earnings analysis reveals that 13.5% of low
wage earners making no more than $40,000.00 per year are
currently bound by an NCA .130 That means approximately
5.5 million American low wage workers have signed an
NCA.131 Notwithstanding the millions of workers bound by
non-competes, this author could find no litigated case filed
by a low wage employee to challenge the legitimacy of an
NCA. This author speculates that this is the case because (1)
employees lack the incentive or financial resources to risk
legal action and (a) are sufficiently chilled when served with
a cease and desist letter or (b) negotiate a settlement with
their employer, even if the agreement is not legally
enforceable. The paucity of cases filed by employers to
enforce NCAs against low wage workers leads this author to
the conclusion that employers have no intention of taking
legal action NCAs against low-wage employees and rely on
the agreements solely as a scare tactic to control turnover or
limit fair competition.132
The education analysis finds that 12% of respondents
without a bachelor’s degree and earning less than $40,000.00
129. Consider This, supra note 18, at 40.
130. Id. at 15.
131. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY WAGE STATISTICS FOR 2018,
https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/netcomp.cgi?year=2018. Approximately 40,794,371
workers fall in the $20–40,000.00 income bracket. This figure is 13.5% of that
number.
132. I speculate this is because employers have no intention of enforcing the
agreements, possibly because (1) their legal counsel has advised against it; (2)
legal fees and costs make enforcement impracticable; (3) for fear of public
backlash or judicial admonition; or (4) because the chilling effect created by use
obviates the need for litigation.
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annually have signed an NCA,133 while 34.7% of respondents
without a four-year degree reported to having signed an NCA
at some point in the past and 14.3% reported currently being
bound by an NCA.134 A 2016 Report from the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy,
(“2016 OEP Report”) found that the percentage of employees
working under an NCA is nearly the same for those without
a four-year degree as it is for all other workers.135
The 2016 OEP Report also discusses the incidence of
NCAs.136 The Report offers explanations for why NCAs are
used in sectors where trade secrets are not at issue: (1) the
agreements provide assurance to an employer that “workers
are unlikely to leave for some period of time, allowing the
firm to capture more of the increased productivity from costly
training it provides, and workers receive more training than
they would otherwise;” (2) the agreements allow employers
to hire employees who do not expect to leave imminently; (3)
employees do not pay attention to non-compete agreements
and are not aware of the rights they are giving up; (4)
employees were not presented with the agreement until they
accepted the job offer.137
With nearly 20% of all workers bound by an NCA and
over 10% of low wage workers restricted by the agreements,
the question is whether employers are using them to protect
legitimate business interests or if employers are using them
to control turnover and fair competition.
B. Benefits of Non-Compete Use
In addition to serving their original purpose of protecting

133. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3.
134. Id. at 15.
135. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 8–9.
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an employer against direct competition by a former
employee, NCAs can also protect an employer’s trade secrets,
confidential information, and investments in specialized
training.138 This willingness to allocate company assets to
training may be due to the assurance that the employee will
be either unlikely to leave the company,139 or, if the employee
does leave he or she will be contractually barred from
accepting employment with a competing firm.140
The 2016 OEP Report focuses on the economic effects of
non-compete contracts on individual workers and society as
a whole.141 The Report acknowledges the potential social
benefits of the agreements: 1. protection of trade secrets; 2.
greater employer incentive to provide costly training; and 3.
identification of workers looking for long-term employment
opportunities.142
In some cases, NCAs may also benefit an employee
through additional training, higher wages, and might even
include compensation after termination of the employment
relationship.143 A low wage worker with access to trade

138. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1; see also Bridget Miller, Pros and Cons
of Noncompete Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR, (Apr. 30, 2014), https://hrdaily
advisor.blr.com/2014/04/30/pros-and-cons-of-noncompete-agreements/.
139. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 8. “In general, firms are reluctant to pay for
training that improves a worker’s ‘general’ skills and makes her more valuable
to it and other firms alike. Economists usually think of general training as
occurring when workers accept wage cuts to compensate their employer for its
expenses in providing training. For various practical reasons, however, workers
may be unwilling to pay for training.”
140. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age:
A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee
Noncompetes, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1163, 1203–04 (2001) (“[D]espite the strategic
importance of cultivating internal talent, employers may not make such
investments for fear that their efforts will merely aid the competition.”).
141. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3–8.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1; see also Bridget Miller, Pros and Cons
of Noncompete Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR, (Apr. 30, 2014), https://hrdaily
advisor.blr.com/2014/04/30/pros-and-cons-of-noncompete-agreements/.;
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secrets, if such an employee exists, may benefit from
additional training because an employer with some
guaranteed return on their investment is more motivated to
expend resources on training.144 Professor Evan Starr
explains that research shows employees in high enforcing
states are more likely to receive firm sponsored training.145
However, this is affected by timing. According to data
gathered by Starr, employees who signed an NCA prior to
taking a job reported an 11% increase in training over
employees who signed after taking a job.146 Approximately
6% of respondents indicated that they were promised
training in exchange for signing an NCA 147 and the data
suggests that NCAs entered into in highly enforceable states
are associated with more training.148 However, in the
absence of equal bargaining power, employee-respondents
reported that they received no compensation in wages or
training for signing the agreement.149
Starr concludes that firms respond to the increased
protection of their confidential information by providing
more training to their employees.150 While employees in
highly enforceable or “high use” states have a higher
probability of training opportunities (30%), so too do “low
use” employees see a rise in training, but at a lower rate

According to Starr’s data, when non-compete agreements are signed before
accepting a job offer, respondents reported 9.7% higher wages. Noncompetes in
the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. However, when signed after taking the
job, employees did not receive a training benefit. Id. By contrast, the OEP Report
found lower wage growth and lower wages in highly enforcing states. OEP
Report, supra note 5, at 19.
144. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3.
145. Consider This, supra note 18, at 26–27.
146. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3.
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id. at 29.
149. Id. at 32.
150. Consider This, supra note 18, at 8, fn13.
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(16%).151 In addition, low use employees see more basic
training (32%) than their high use counterparts (25%), and
see less training to upgrade skills (69%) than their high use
counterparts (74%).152
Another benefit of NCAs is that they may add value to a
company considering a sale, merger, or acquisition.153
However, some courts have held that changes in ownership
change the identity of the employer, which requires a new
agreement and renders the original NCA void.154
Finally, in addition to additional training and fostering
client confidence,155 NCAs can provide a sense of job security
and reassurance to co-workers who do not have to worry
about fellow employees unfairly competing against them.
Some employees take comfort in knowing that their
coworkers’ postemployment opportunities will not endanger
their jobs.
C. Costs Associated with Non-Compete Agreements

151. Id. at 41.
152. Id.
153. Michael R. Greco, 8 Reasons Why Small Businesses Should Use NonCompete Agreements, TLNT, (June 5, 2012), https://www.tlnt.com/8-reasonswhy-small-businesses-should-use-non-compete-agreements/
[hereinafter
“8
Reasons”]. For example, in Pino v. Spanish Broad. Sys of Fla., Inc., 564 So.2d 186,
189, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that an assignable or transferrable
employment contract that includes a non-compete can be enforced by the
purchaser against the employee. In Great American Opportunities, Inc. v.
Cherrydale Fundraising, LLC, the court held that that “absent specific language
prohibiting assignment, noncompete covenants, even though part of a personal
service contract, remain enforceable by an assignee when transferred to the
assignee as part of a sale or transfer of business assets regardless of whether the
employment contract contains a clause expressly authorizing such assignability,
so long as the assignee engages in the same business as the assignor.” No. 3718VCP, 2010 WL 338219 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2010).
154. For example, Massachusetts law requires a new agreement when the
employment relationship undergoes a “material change.” Griffith Practice Note,
supra note 1.
155. 8 Reasons, supra note 151.
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1. Bargaining Power Forfeited, Lower Wages, and
Reduced Job Satisfaction
Also identified in the 2016 OEP Report are the costs
associated with NCAs. For example, agreements not to
compete forfeit an employee’s bargaining power156 and can
result in lower wages.157 This is because an employee who is
bound by an NCA may have limited prospective employment
opportunities and the agreement may effectively tie him or
her to a current position for which the employee is
overqualified. Having no good employment options in his or
her field of expertise, an employee lacks the leverage
necessary to negotiate better employment terms with the
employer, such as a wage increase or a better benefit
package.158
Timing can limit an employee’s bargaining position. One
survey cited in the 2016 OEP Report found that in 70% of
cases, the employee was asked to sign the NCA after
declining other offers of employment, and in almost 50% of
cases, the agreement was not disclosed until or after the
employee’s first day on the job.159 This lack of transparency
has a direct impact on the employer/employee relationship.
Employees asked to sign an NCA after accepting an
employment offer are 12.5% less satisfied with their job and
experience no wage and training benefits.160 By contrast,
employees who sign prior to accepting a job offer and have
alternative employment options earn 9.7% higher wages, are
156. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 9.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 18–19. Starr reports
that negotiation over noncompetes is rare, with 10% of those surveyed attempting
to negotiate terms. He finds, however, a difference in negotiating depending on
timing, with more employees attempting to negotiate if the agreement is
presented prior to accepting a job offer than after acceptance.
159. Compare OEP Report, supra note 5, at 12–13, with Noncompetes in the
U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 18 (61% of individuals with non-competes first
learned they would be asked to sign before accepting job offer).
160. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3.
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11% more likely than average to receive training and are
6.6% more likely to be satisfied in their employment.161
In addition, there are other situations in which NCAs
lead to lower wages, depressed wage growth, less disposable
income, and fewer opportunities to improve one’s socialeconomic station.162 For instance, an employee bound by an
NCA may be forced to take a job outside his or her area of
expertise, to comply with contract terms or to err on the side
of caution by declining a job opportunity in order to avoid a
breach. Or, he or she may be willing to take a position at a
much lower wage than other prospective candidates.163 Aside
from the obvious negative impact this has on the affected
employee and his or her family, it also has a negative impact
on other employees in that field by keeping wages in that
industry lower than they otherwise would be. Further,
prospective candidates who refuse to agree to an NCA will
be eliminated from the job pool, reducing the number of
qualified candidates to “bid up” wages.164
2. Impact on Job Creation, Recruitment & Mobility
Non-compete agreements may reduce job creation and
result in fewer available jobs, thus reducing a worker’s
chance to find the best possible employment match.165 This
affects the whole of society because preventing workers from
taking jobs that best suit their career goals reduces “job
161. Id. at 2, 25.
162. White House Report, supra note 5, at 6 (suggesting that high enforcement
states “see lower wages in general, and that wage disparities between high and
low enforcement states actually grow as workers age.”).
163. Noah Smith, Noncompete Agreements Take a Toll on the Economy,
BLOOMBERG OPINION, (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/
articles/2018-03-22/noncompete-agreements-take-a-toll-on-the-economy.
164. Id. See also Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 30
(“[W]ith early notice, employees may also be more careful in accepting the job
from among their set of alternatives, thereby encouraging firms to compete for
their services by offering better employment packages.”).
165. OEP Report supra note 5, at 3–4.
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churn” and lowers productivity.166 Further, when an
employee is prevented from working in his or her chosen
field, which allows the employee to collect a paycheck and
contribute to the tax base, he or she may have no alternative
other than to file for unemployment or utilize other public
support programs.
Additionally, recruiting efforts may be hampered
because an employer is prevented from recruiting the best
possible candidates to fill open positions.167 This can happen
when the very best candidates refuse to interview with a
company that requires an NCA. Therefore, employers may
be forced to hire less qualified or experienced workers
leaving businesses with increased training expenses. Indeed,
it is for these very reasons that some employers have never
used or have eliminated use of non-competes.168 Some
companies have used their opposition to the agreements as a
recruiting tool to entice interviewees with the ability to move
their careers in a new direction at a time of interviewee’s
choosing.169
The importance of employee mobility cannot be
understated. Allowing the employee to move on to better
employment conditions benefits her as well as the employer
and the worker who takes his or her place. This makes
employee mobility a valuable commodity because it allows
workers an opportunity to better their lives, creates
employment opportunities for other workers, improves
employee morale, keeps the employment pool fluid, helps
employers fill ordinary positions, benefits society because
skills are being used to their maximum potential, and works
166. Id. at 4. “Job churn helps to raise labor productivity by achieving a better
matching of workers and firms.”
167. Rethinking Non-compete Agreements, supra note 4, at 63–64 (discussing
the perspective of Josh James, CEO of Domo, that the agreements undercut his
company’s ability to attract qualified workers).
168. Id. at 66.
169. Id. at 65.
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well with at-will employment principles, which favor the
ability of the parties to terminate employment at any time,
for any reason.
Freedom of movement may be even more important to
low wage workers than to their higher wage counterparts. A
low wage worker may be quite willing to change jobs for a
very small increase in his or her compensation as compared
to higher wage workers who may be less likely to start over
with a new employer. Consider a mere $40/week raise. A
highly compensated employee would likely see the raise as
not substantial enough to justify changing jobs and starting
over with a new employer. However, to the lower wage
worker making $25,000.00 annually, a $2,080.00 annual
increase is a significant raise (almost 10%) and could serve
as sufficient motivation to change employment.170
Some low wage workers may be especially vulnerable to
the harsh realities of employment restraints. For example,
school-aged employees and recent graduates paying off
student loans need the ability to move from job to job without
restraint and may not understand the implications of signing
NCAs. If a student has loans, he or she may take the first job
offer in retail or fast food that comes along just to save money
for school or pay bills. A full-time student may be limited to
sectors that offer part-time employment and needs the
flexibility of changing jobs if a more lucrative opportunity
presents itself.
3. The Chilling Effect and Unrealized Potential
Non-competes have the potential of forcing an employee
to forgo using an acquired skill set or give up his or her
chosen occupation under threat of legal action.171 This threat
170. This assumes 52 paid work weeks.
171. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15;
Stephanie Russell-Craft, I Learned the Hard Way Why Non-competes are Bad for
Journalists, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (June 16, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/non-compete-agreement-journalism.php
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creates a chilling effect,172 causing an employee to remain in
a job where he or she may be unhappy, unchallenged, and
overqualified. Consequently, another employer is deprived of
the employee’s skill set, while the current employer retains
an unhappy employee who may lack the proper motivation
to perform to his or her potential. Dissatisfied and unhappy
employees take a toll on a company by cultivating a negative
work environment, discouraging co-workers from achieving
their maximum potential, wasting management’s time, and
reducing profit margins.173 Chilling also affects an
employee’s co-workers. When an employer litigates against a
former employee in bad faith, co-workers can become fearful
that they too will be sued if they resign their position even if
the contract is unenforceable.
The chilling effect created by companies threatening to
enforce an NCA is real and can be devistating. In an article
about her own experience involving a non-compete that cost
her a job with Reuters, Stephanie Russell-Kraft, a journalist,
discusses the use of the non-compete by her former employer,
Law360, a subsidiary of LexisNexis.174 According to RussellCraft, she was assured on her first day of work in 2013 that
Law360 had never used the agreement to prevent an
employee from taking another job.175 Notwithstanding
verbal representations, when she left Law360 in 2015 for a
position at Reuters, Law360 sent a warning letter to Reuters,
which prompted her termination.176 Russell-Craft was told
the NCA was probably illegal, but she lacked the funds to
[hereinafter “I Learned the Hard Way”].
172. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15; White
House Report, supra note 5, at 11.
173. Richard Trevino II, A Few Disgruntled Employees Can Destroy Your
Company
Culture,
THE
ENTREPRENEUR,
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/319065.
174. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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prove it in court.177 This is a clear example of the chilling
effect that even unenforceable non-competes can have on
employees. In her article, Russell-Kraft identified other
media outlets that used the agreements, such as the social
and video news company NowThis News,178 the conservative
website Independent Journal Review, and global media
company Mashable.179 Law360 reached an agreement in
2016 with the New York State Attorney General’s Office,
agreeing to stop the use of the agreements for its editorial
employees.180 This was of little help to Russell-Kraft, who
had to settle for a much less attractive benefit package as a
freelancer.181 Again, her experience provides a relatable
example of the damaging effects of non-competes on
employees and the whole of society.
For employees who have the funds to avail themselves
of a legal remedy, it is important to keep in mind that, in
most cases, the employee will have to retain an attorney and
absorb the expense of fees and costs related to such legal
action. An employee lacking the financial resources to
commence an action or defend against one, like RussellCraft, may likely be forced to cease and desist and forfeit her
legal remedy. Even NCAs that are clearly overreaching and
unenforceable can cause a chilling effect because employees
simply lack the resources to obtain a declaratory judgment
either striking the agreement entirely or modifying the
unreasonable terms.
177. Id.
178. Id.; See also Cora Lewis, Steven Perlberg, Now This Forbids Staff From
Taking Jobs at Other News Outlets, BUZZFEED NEWS, (updated June 9, 2017,
4:17 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/coralewis/nowthis-newsnoncompete.
179. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169.
180. Eric T. Schneiderman, New York’s attorney general hos gotten Law360 to
stop requiring non-compete agreements for its journalists https://www.niemanlab
.org/reading/new-yorks-attorney-general-has-gotten-law360-to-abandon-noncompete-agreements-for-its-journalists/ (2016).
181. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169.
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In other words, low wage workers who are the most likely
workers to lack the financial means, support, or motivation
obtain no benefit from available legal remedies because they
lack the funds to consult and retain with counsel, or because
they do not know there is a legal remedy available to them.
In addition, taking offensive legal action against a former
employer is risky for the employee because prospective
employers may be discouraged from hiring the applicant for
lack of references, for fear of future litigation, or due to a
reputation damaged through rumors.182 Employees need to
consider the public nature of a lawsuit and must weigh the
risks against the benefits.183
4. Unjust Enrichment
In the low wage sector, where NCAs are more often used
to control turnover costs rather than protect legitimate
business interests, there is the possibility that the
agreement can unjustly enrich the employer. This is because
at some point during the employment relationship the
employer may be sufficiently compensated for the costs of
training but the NCA remains in force resulting in a windfall
to the employer.184
In his article, Protecting Employer Investment in
Training: Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, Brandon
Long discusses investments in training and how best to

182. Janice Harper, What to Expect if You Sue Your Employer, HUFFPOST,
(updated Mar. 11, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-harper/what-toexpect-when-you-s_b_1194955.html.
183. See Howard Levitt, These Lawsuits Against an Employer Will Make it
Hard to Land a New Job, FINANCIAL POST, (Aug. 25, 2015, 1:36 PM),
http://business.financialpost.com/executive/management-hr/these-lawsuitsagainst-an-employer-will-make-it-hard-to-land-a-new-job; Hal Lancaster, What
Are the Risks You Face When You Sue Your Employer?, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, (Apr. 15, 1997, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB8610536538328000.
184. Brandon S. Long, Protecting Employer Investment in Training:
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 Duke L.J. 1295, 1315 (Mar. 2005).
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protect those investments. He acknowledges that NCAs are
not widely recognized as the proper tool for controlling
turnover and training costs,185 but are, nevertheless, used for
that purpose. Rather than bind an employee by an NCA,
Long suggests the use of a repayment agreement that would
reimburse the employer for the cost of training should the
employee quit before the cost of training is recouped by the
employer.186 By allowing the company to calculate “the cost
of training and the revenue generated from the employee’s
use of training, the employer can [] determine when it has
broken even” and training costs have been recouped.187 Long
finds this approach more favorable, in part, because most
NCAs are valid for the entire duration of an employee’s
tenure, yet an employer may recoup costs associated with
training well before the employment relationship is
terminated.188 This overprotection gives the employer a
windfall at the employee’s expense because the employer
remains protected long after the training investment has
been repaid.189
Long’s approach has the potential of protecting
employees against employer overreach, but it requires
businesses to ascertain the amounts allocated for training.
As discussed above, most companies do not know how much
turnover costs their company and don’t even try to figure it
out.190 Calculating cost and recoupment time could cost
employers money and find them allocating assets for a task
that benefits the employee more than employer. In addition,
policing the method of calculating recoupment costs would

185. Id. at 1311 (“A survey of 105 noncompete cases did not even find the
employer’s investment in training significant enough to warrant discussion.”).
186. Id. at 1311–20.
187. Id. at 1319.
188. Id. at 1315–16.
189. Id.
190. How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?, supra note 43.
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require the enforcement agency or court to conduct complex
case-by-case analyses that may result in inconsistent and
unpredictable rulings.
5. Deprivation of Critical Goods and Services
Non-competes can also prevent consumers from
obtaining critical goods and services, like health care.191 For
example, preventing a health care worker from practicing
medicine or working as a health aide deprives the whole
community of necessary medical care and possibly life-saving
treatments, notwithstanding the legitimate business
interests potentially at stake.192 To address this issue, some
states have passed laws banning the use of NCAs for
employees in the health care industry.193 Restricting the
ability of a medical professional, health care worker, or other
provider of critical services to move from one employer to
another deprives the public of that worker’s skill and
expertise and results in injury to the community.
6. Use of Non-Competes in Terminations Without
Cause
Using an NCA to protect legitimate business interests
allows an employer to use the agreement as a shield against
unfair competition. However, sometimes employers use the
agreements as a sword to control free markets and fair
competition. For example, imagine an employer who hires a
skilled employee under an NCA knowing he or she cannot
afford to retain the employee long-term. The employer hires
the candidate under a NCA and then subsequently
terminates the employee without cause and for no reason
other than to prevent competing businesses from hiring the
employee and benefitting from his or her skill set and to
191. White House Report, supra note 5, at 14–15.
192. Id. at 14–15.
193. For example, Delaware, Colorado, Texas, New Mexico have passed
legislation. See id. at 7, 15.
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prevent the employee from working in his or her area of
expertise.194 While this scenario involving a highly skilled
employee may not play out in the low-wage sector, the idea
of hiring an employee under an NCA and then terminating
the employee without cause is certainly a scenario that can
affect the low wage worker.
According the 2016 OEP Report, approximately half of
the states in the U.S. find, or are likely to find, NCAs
enforceable against employees who are fired without
cause.195 The knowledge that an employer could use an NCA
offensively discourages prospective employees from
accepting a position with an employer who requires a noncompete. More importantly, vesting this degree of power in
the employer can have devastating effects on an employee
who has done nothing to deserve termination, not to mention
the potentially devastating effect on area businesses and fair
competition. As discussed earlier, at-will employment gives
the employer and employee the same rights to terminate the
employment relationship without notice or cause, allowing
the employer to manage his staffing issues and giving the
employee the freedom to keep his or her career moving
forward and upward. Using at-will employment in tandem
with a non-compete restraint interferes with the purposes
that justify the at-will relationship by preventing the
employee from exercising control over his or her career.
New York is an interesting state to look at because there
appears to be either a real or perceived judicial split
regarding whether non-competes remain in effect after an
involuntary termination without cause.196 In Post v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., the New York Court of
194. E.g., How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15.
195. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 16; Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note
45 (providing a comprehensive list of states, including AL, CT, DE, GA, ID, IL,
IN, KS, LA, ME, MI, MN, MS, MO, NJ, NC, OH, PA, SD, TN, TX, UT VA, WA).
196. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. According to this chart, courts
in New York are split.
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Appeals dealt with a situation in which the Plaintiffs, two
employees of Merrill Lynch, were fired without cause and,
thereafter, entered into competition against their former
employer.197 Plaintiffs’ pension plan was tied to a noncompete provision in their employment contracts.198 By
competing with the Defendant, Merrill Lynch argued that
the Plaintiffs had forfeited their rights to their pension
plan.199 The Court held that “[a]n employer should not be
permitted to use offensively an anticompetition clause
coupled with a forfeiture provision to economically cripple a
former employee and simultaneously deny other potential
employers his services.”200
Some New York courts have interpreted Post as voiding
NCAs if an employee is terminated without cause, while
others draw a distinction because the Post noncompete was
tied to a forfeiture of pension rights. In Wise v. Transco, Inc.,
the appellate court distinguished the holding in Post, and
explained that “while plaintiff [in Wise] was involuntarily
discharged, th[e] restrictive covenant does not involve a
forfeiture of rights under an “employee pension benefit plan”
that would be covered by ERISA.”201 By contrast, in SIFCO
Industs., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Tech., Inc., the federal
District Court adopted a different interpretation of Post,
holding that “New York courts will not enforce a noncompetition provision in an employment agreement where
the former employee was involuntarily terminated [without
197. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 84 (1979).
198. Id. at 87.
199. Id. at 87.
200. Id. at 89. “In Post, the New York Court of Appeals held that an employee
discharged without cause has the right to challenge the reasonableness of a
noncompetition forfeiture clause, not that such an employee is automatically
excused from adhering to the clause.” Peter L. Altieri, David J. Clark, After
Termination “Without Cause”: Restrictive Covenants, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN
(Feb. 8 2007), https://www.ebglaw.com/news/after-termination-without-causerestrictive-covenants/.
201. Wise v. Transco, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 1039, 1039 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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cause].”202 In finding that the defendants were involuntarily
terminated, the court held the agreements unenforceable.203
Because there appears to be some disagreement in
interpreting Post,204 the legislation proposed in Part IV
makes clear that offensive use of NCAs is prohibited.
7. Brain Drain
In addition to lower wage growth and lower initial
wages, the 2016 OEP Report disclosed that stricter
enforcement of NCAs is tied to “brain drain,” which is
supported by data showing that highly skilled workers move
from enforcing states to non-enforcing states.205 Silicon
Valley is often cited as the “poster child” for economic growth
in a strongly non-enforceable state.206 Analysts have
suggested that because California does not generally enforce
non-compete agreements, Silicon Valley benefited from
“knowledge spillovers,” a byproduct of “rapid employee
movement between employers and to startups.”207 This
freedom of movement results in “brain-gain” for the nonenforcing state and brain drain for the enforcing state.208
Enforcing states suppress innovation because “knowledge

202. SIFCO Industs., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Tech., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 155,
158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
203. Id. at 158–59.
204. See also Greystone Funding Corp. v. Kutner, 137 A.D.3d 427, 427 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2016) (calling attention to opposing holdings in Post and Wise); Griffith
Practice Note, supra note 1 (recognizing disagreement by federal courts in
interpreting New York’s position on termination without cause).
205. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 23.
206. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3–6.
207. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 575 (1999).
208. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 860–61.
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spillover” is reduced and diverted to other states.209 While
brain drain may not be a problem in the realm of low wage,
low-skilled workers, it is another potential cost associated
with the use of NCAs because the agreements can have a
negative impact on entrepreneurship and impede
innovation.210
IV. RECENT LITIGATION AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
A. Using Existing Law to Investigate Violations of Law
State Attorneys General (“A.G.s”) have taken an active
role in identifying employment covenants that restrict a
company’s ability to recruit or hire competitors’
employees.211 At least eight fast-food restaurants, notorious
for hiring low-wage workers, are under investigation in ten
states and the District of Columbia for their use of noncompete and non-poaching agreements.212 The A.G.s are

209. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 861 (“The positive cycle appears
geographically bound: worker mobility is a primary vehicle of knowledge
spillovers, which in turn enhances regional innovation and growth, leading to
increased opportunities and job mobility.”).
210. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 861.
211. Steve Sbraccia, Several States Investigating Non-Compete Clauses In
Fast-Food Jobs, CBS (Updated July 13, 2018, 5:12 AM), https://www.cbs17.com/
news/investigators/several-states-investigating-non-complete-clauses-in-fastfood-jobs/1298896501 [hereinafter “Non-Compete Clauses In Fast-Food Jobs”];
Michael L. Diamond, State Attorneys General Want to Know More About FastFood ‘No Poach’ and Noncompete Agreements, USA TODAY NETWORK (July 9,
2018, 6:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2018/07/09/
fast-food-no-poach-agreements/769560002/.
212. Id.; see also Press Release, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, AG
Grewal Seeks Records From Eight Fast Food Companies About Use of Employee
Non-Compete Agreements (Jul 9, 2018), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/
pr20180709a.html. Non-poaching agreements are agreements between
businesses in which they agree not to hire or solicit each other’s employees. These
agreements can raise antitrust issues “if they are not reasonably tailored to
support a broader, legitimate business collaboration.” Kevin R. Miller & Colin A.
Thakkar, State Attorneys General Step Up Antitrust Probes of Franchise Industry
Hiring Practices, JACKSONLEWIS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.noncompete
report.com/2018/08/state-attorneys-general-step-up-antitrust-probes-of-
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spearheading the investigations amid concerns for employee
mobility as well as possible antitrust violations for the use of
non-poaching agreements.213
Another example of legal action by state A.G.s is the
2016 settlement with Jimmy John’s, in which the New York
and Illinois A.G.s obtained agreements from Jimmy John’s
to halt the use of NCAs for their franchise employees.214 In
2018, the New York and Illinois A.G.s coordinated their
efforts to obtain a settlement with WeWork Companies, Inc.,
which released over 1,400 employees from their NCAs.215
The agreements applied broadly to all employees regardless
of job duties and access to confidential information and
included cleaners, mail associates and baristas, some

franchise-industry-hiring-practices/. For more discussion on non-poaching
agreements, see Gauri Punjabi, Are Anti-Poaching Agreements Enforceable in
New York? Not in the Absence of a Protectable Interest Says One New York Federal
Court (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.employmentmattersblog.com/2014/02/areanti-poaching-agreements-enforceable-in-new-york-not-in-the-absence-of-aprotectable-interest-says-one-new-york-federal-court/ (last visited 11-13-18); Jeff
John Robert, Tech Workers Will Get Average of $5,770 Under Final Anti-Poaching
Settlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-antipoach-order/ (discussing the trouble Adobe Systems, Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel
Corp., Pixar, Lucasfilm, and Intuit ran into in using these agreements).
213. Kevin R. Miller & Colin A. Thakkar, State Attorneys General Step Up
Antitrust Probes of Franchise Industry Hiring Practices, JACKSONLEWIS (Aug.
22, 2018), https://www.noncompetereport.com/2018/08/state-attorneys-generalstep-up-antitrust-probes-of-franchise-industry-hiring-practices/; Michael L.
Diamond, State Attorneys General Want to Know More About Fast-Food ‘No
Poach’ and Noncompete Agreements, USA TODAY NETWORK (Jul 9, 2018 6:37
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2018/07/09/fast-foodno-poach-agreements/769560002/.
214. Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7; Oppressive
Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8; Rethinking Non-compete Agreements,
supra note 4 at 66. NY BUS. JOURNAL, Jimmy John’s Settles Non-Compete Case
with A.G.’s Office (June 22, 2016) https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/
2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-settles-non-compete-case-with-a-g.html.
215. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General
Madigan Reaches Settlement with WeWork to End Use of Overly Broad NonCompetes (Sept. 18, 2018), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/
2018_09/20180918.html.

2019]

NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

D45

making as little as $15/hour.216
The New York State A.G. has secured additional
settlements that have released employees from their NCAs.
On August 4, 2016, the Attorney General announced a
settlement with EMSI (Examination Management Service,
Inc.) to cease use of non-competes for most of its New York
employees.217 The agreements prohibited employees from
working for a competitor located within fifty miles of any
EMSI location at which the employee worked for a period of
nine months after leaving EMSI.218 On June 15, 2016, the
Attorney General announced a settlement with Law360, a
subsidiary of LexisNexis, which required its editorial
employees to sign non-competes that prevented them from
working for any media outlet providing news for a period of
one year.219 The A.G. was able to negotiate settlements by
arguing that the agreements exceeded the scope of protection
recognized by New York courts.220 Companies that attempt
to protect interests that are not recognized as ‘legitimate’ run
the risk of investigation by the A.G.
Attorneys General across the U.S. have brokered the
release of NCAs for thousands of employees and have
216. Press Release, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, supra note 212.
217. Mark Iandolo, EMSI to Stop Using Non-Compete Agreements in New York
State, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Aug. 5, 2016), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/
510986488-emsi-to-stop-using-non-compete-agreements-in-new-york-state
218. Id.
219. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, NY Attorney General Sends a Message: Rethink
Non-Compete
Agreements,
LEXOLOGY,
(July
19,
2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=852495d7-7040-404c-a0cbd4610478c901.
220. Courts in the state require that terms be no greater in scope and duration
than necessary to protect legitimate business interests, such as trade secrets and
confidential information. Lisa C. Sullivan & Matthew T. McLaughlin, New York
and Illinois AGs Crack Down on Use of Noncompetes in Settlement with WeWork
and Release Guidance on Use of Noncompetes, NIXON PEABODY (Sept. 20,
2018), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2018/09/20/new-york-and
-illinois-ags-release-guidance-on-use-of-non-competes [hereinafter “New York
and Illinois AG’s Crack Down”].
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conducted investigations into the illegal use of the
agreements.221 This commitment should send a message to
state legislatures and employers that the use of noncompetes should be limited to the protection of legitimate
business interests and that failure to do so will result in legal
action by state A.G.s. Unfortunately, A.G. offices lack the
resources to uncover every violation of law in the state.
Companies that have the foresight to restrict non-compete
use to the protection of legitimate business interests can
avoid legal scrutiny, but others use the agreements to bind
all employees without consideration of protectable,
legitimate business interests or include terms that are not
limited in scope and duration. Such agreements run afoul of
state laws that allow protection of only legitimate business
interests and could trigger investigation or legal action. The
fear of public backlash has certainly been useful in securing
releases.222 However, investigating and exposing abuse takes
time and employees can suffer severe financial consequences
before help arrives on the scene. In addition, some companies
may elect to roll the dice if the courts in their state reform
unreasonable terms rather than void the agreement.
B. Legislative Proposals
1. Federal Level
To date, action at the federal level against the use of

221. Non-Compete Clauses In Fast-Food Jobs, supra note 209; New York and
Illinois AGs Crack Down, supra note 220. In 2019, NY A.G. James joined a multistate coalition of Attorneys General to reach a settlement in which Arby’s,
Dunkin’, Five Guys and Little Caesars agreed to cease using non-poach
agreements to restrict employee mobility. Press Release, New York Attorney
General’s Office, Attorney General Letitia James Joins Multistate Settlement To
Cease Fast Food Usage Of No-Poach Agreements, (Mar. 12, 2019).
222. E.g., Robert M. Isackson, Backlash Against Jimmy John’s Non-Compete
Agreement Highlights Risks of Overzealous Business Protection Measures,
MONDAQ (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/365698/Trade
+Secrets/Backlash+Against+Jimmy+Johns+NonCompete+Agreement+Highligh
ts+Risks+Of+Overzealous+Business+Protection+Measures.
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employment restraints has been in the form of presidential
recommendations and proposed legislation. While
employment contract law is one area that has traditionally
been left to the states, “that fact alone does not immunize
state employment laws from preemption if Congress in fact
contemplated preemption.”223
Recent non-compete legislative proposals do not contain
preemption clauses and may allow the states to regulate noncompetes as well. In 2015, Senate Bill 1504, the Mobility and
Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act was
introduced to prohibit the use of non-competes for low-wage
workers and establish rules requiring disclosure to
prospective employees prior to employment. However, the
bill failed after being introduced in the Senate.224 The
attention on non-competes was not lost on the Obama White
House and the administration advocated for legislation to
limit or ban the agreements.225
Senate Bill 2782, the Workplace Mobility Act of 2018,
was introduced to create a nationwide ban prohibiting any
company engaged in interstate commerce from requiring its
employees to execute non-compete agreements.226 The bill

223. Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 2014).
224. MOVE Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill defined low wage
employees as making less than $15/hour or $31,200.00 annually.
225. Id. The administration published Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of
the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses in May, 2016 in an effort to
“identify policies that could be used to promote a fair and dynamic labor market.”
3, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report
_final2.pdf. In addition, the administration called the states to action,
encouraging the states to pass reformative legislation banning non-competes for
specific categories of workers, improving transparency of use, and incentivizing
employers to write enforceable contracts. Christopher Steif, Senators Introduce
Bill for Nationwide Non-Compete Ban, FISHER PHILLIPS (May 14, 2018),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-and-Trade-Secrets/senatorsintroduce-bill-for-nationwide-ban-on-non-competes, citing State Call to Action on
Non-Competes, (October 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/competition/noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf.
226. Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018),
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would allow the Secretary of Labor to investigate and
prosecute violations and impose civil fines up to $5,000.00.
In addition, a private right of action would be established
and the ability to contractually protect trade secrets would
be preserved.227
On January 15, 2019, Senator Marco Rubio introduced
S.124, otherwise known as The Freedom to Compete Act. 228
The Bill proposes an amendment the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, and would retroactively eliminate the use of noncompete agreements for certain non-exempt employees.229
The state-to-state disparity of enforceability of NCAs
argues in favor of federal legislation resolving the issue.230
However, the flat ban in the 2017 version of the MOVE Act
hurts businesses because it abandons the defense of
legitimate business interests currently recognized by state
courts. For example, New York courts currently permit noncompetes if they are intended to provide: (1) protection from
competition by a former employee whose services are unique
or extraordinary; (2) protection against the misappropriation
of trade secrets or confidential customer lists; and (3)
protection against appropriating the goodwill of clients or
customers.231 Courts in Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2782/text?r=6; see also
Christopher Steif, Senators Introduce Bill for Nationwide Non-Compete Ban,
FISHER PHILLIPS (May 14, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Competeand-Trade-Secrets/senators-introduce-bill-for-nationwide-ban-on-non-competes.
The House version of the bill is H.R. 5631.
227. Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2782/text?r=6.
228. Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Congress (2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/124. This Bill remains
in Committee at the time this Paper was re-submitted.
229. Id.
230. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 839–41 (discussing the varied court
interpretations and the uncertainty that results).
231. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93; Beck’s State By State Survey, supra
note 45.
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Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin permit non-competes if they
are intended to provide (1) protection against the
misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential
information; and (2) protection of customer relationships.232
A flat ban on non-competes disregards the states’ recognized
protectable business interests.
Moreover, the proposed federal legislation’s one-size-fitsall approach fails to address the diversity and unique needs
of the states, which is better left to the individual states to
determine through their state-level elected officials. In
contrast, the 2015 MOVE Act that bans non-competes for low
wage workers would be a better place to start by providing
protection to all low wage workers country-wide and
removing any disparity that is currently present between the
states.
Another suggestion for federal legislation would be a bill
that creates general rules for use of NCAs, such as required
disclosure during the application process and a prohibition
of enforcement against employees terminated without cause.
Nevertheless, it is this author’s opinion that, given the
diversity among the socio-economic landscapes of the states,
state legislators are in the best position to define a low wage
worker and design legislation that reflects the needs of the
state and the best interests of their constituents.233
2. State Level
Recent public exposure of non-compete misuse has
encouraged state legislators to introduce bills banning or
placing limitations and restrictions on their use. As

232. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45.
233. For example, in their article Non-Compete Clauses in Physician
Employment Contracts are Bad for Our Health, Hazel Beh and Ramsey Ross
discuss the unique issue faced by Hawaii in recruiting and retaining physicians,
such as the high cost of living in Hawaii and the geographic isolation of the state.
Hazel G. Beh & Ramsey Ross, Non-Compete Clauses in Physician Employment
Contracts are Bad for Our Health, 14 Hawaii Bar J. 79, 90 (2011).
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previously discussed, both Massachusetts and Illinois have
recently passed non-compete laws. The 2018 Massachusetts
law carries a requirement that the non-compete agreement
be presented at the time the offer of employment is made.
Further, it requires “fair and reasonable consideration
independent from the continuation of employment,” when
the non-compete is signed after employment. These
provisions promote transparency and require some benefit to
the employee in exchange for signing the contract. The
Massachusetts law also wisely prohibits non-competes for
employees who do not likely encounter trade secrets or
confidential information: employees under 18 years old and
students engaged in short-term employment. In addition, the
law prohibits enforcement against an employee terminated
without cause, which limits an employer to defensive use
rather than offensive use of the agreement. Nonetheless,
there is no prohibition against the use of non-competes in the
low-wage sector.
While the 2016 Illinois Freedom to Work Act prohibits
non-competes for low-wage workers, it is not nearly as
comprehensive as the Massachusetts law and does not
contemplate any other class of vulnerable worker, nor
establish rules for use in other sectors that could promote
transparency.234 The Act provides protection to low-wage
earners but goes no further. That said, it smartly limits
coverage to employees making minimum wage. Expanding
the income threshold beyond the low-wage sector is a
dangerous proposition to businesses trying to protect
legitimate interests. While the low-wage income threshold
may seem arbitrary, workers in this sector are not likely to
possess specialized skills or have access to trade secrets or
confidential client information. If an employer has a
legitimate business interest to protect, it will have to offer a
salary in excess of the minimum wage.

234. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 860 (effective Jan. 1, 2017).
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In other states, bills have been introduced but have not
become law. Pennsylvania introduced a series of bills in the
2017 session, one of which would ban non-competes entirely,
another that would ban them for low wage workers, and
another that would ban them for health care workers.235 In
2018, Vermont introduced a bill to prohibit non-compete
agreements with some narrow exceptions.236 New Jersey
reintroduced a bill in 2018 that places limitations on
restrictive covenants and contains employee exempt
classifications.237 In 2015, New York Assemblyman Jeffrey
Dinowitz introduced a bill banning the use of non-competes
for low wage workers.238 The bill, known as the Mobility and
Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act targeted
employees making less than $15.00 an hour, but it never
reached a vote.239
In January 2017, New York Senator Diane Savino reintroduced the “MOVE Act” as S4610, a bill prohibiting
employers from requiring low-wage employees to enter into
non-compete agreements.240 A low wage employee was
235. Pennsylvania H.B. 1938, (2017), would prohibit non-compete agreements
and provides for an award of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages to the
prevailing employee, (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?
sYear=2017&sInd=0&body=h&type=b&bn=1938), while H.B. 1590 (2017) would
prohibit non-compete agreements for low wage workers and imposes penalties in
the form of fines (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?s
Year=2017&sInd=0&body=h&type=b&bn=1590), and H.B. 788 (2017) would
prohibit non-competes in health care practitioner employment agreements
(http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2017&sInd=0&b
ody=h&type=b&bn=788).
236. H.B.
H.%20556).

556,

(2018),

(https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2018/

237. A. 1769, S. 2872, 2018 Leg., 218th Sess. (N.J. 2018), reintroduced from
last session proposed bills A. 5261, S. 3518, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
2018/Bills/A2000/1769_I1.PDF.
238. A. 8108, S. 6797, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2015/a8108/amendment/original.
239. A. 8108, S. 6797, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2015/a8108/amendment/original.
240. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
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defined as an employee who, excluding overtime
compensation, makes the greater of (1) $15 per hour; or (2)
state or local minimum wage; or (3) an annual compensation
that is equal to or less than $31,200.00.241 The bill was
introduced in the Assembly by Assemblyman Dinowitz under
A1139, but died in committee.242
In June 2017, Senator Catharine Young introduced
S6554, a bill amending the labor law to prohibit the use of
noncompete agreements for employees earning less than
$75,000.00 per year.243 The bill was also introduced in the
Assembly by Assemblyman Dinowitz,244 but it was never
voted on.245 For employees making more than $75,000.00,
the bills required agreements to be in writing and signed by
both employer and employee.246 In addition, the bill would
require employers to provide non-compete agreements to
employees by the earlier of an offer of employment or thirty

.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4610/amendment/original.
241. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4610/amendment/original; By the end of 2018, the
minimum wage for NYC fast food workers and hospitality food service employees
at businesses with 11 or more employees will be $15.00, which, at 40 hours/week
translates to $31,200.00. https://www3.swipeclock.com/blog/minimum-wagechanges-2018-state-state-guide/.
242. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/A1139.
243. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554.
244. A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a.
245. A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. See also Judah L. Rosenblatt’s
article discussing the New York City legislation introduced that targets low wage
workers and implements rules for use in other sectors. Which States are Likely to
Enact Laws Restricting Non-Compete Agreements in 2018?, THE NATIONAL LAW
REVIEW, (Feb. 8, 2018) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/which-states-arelikely-to-enact-laws-restricting-non-compete-agreements-2018.
246. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a.
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days before the agreement effective date.247 If a current
employee is not bound by a non-compete, his or her employer
would be required to provide notice at least thirty days before
the effective date of the agreement.248 Significantly, the bill
provides that if an employee subject to a non-compete is
discharged without cause, the non-compete is no longer
enforceable.249 The provision resolves the current state of
uncertainty in New York courts regarding the use of noncompetes as a sword rather than a shield. Unfortunately,
New York’s proposed law, S6554, setting the threshold at
$75,000.00, is simply too heavy handed and is far more likely
to prevent employers from protecting legitimate business
interests. 250
3. Pros and Cons of Current Initiatives
There are some protections in both enacted and proposed
legislation that promote transparency and the protection of
only legitimate business interests. Industry-specific laws
and initiatives can address local needs or preserve valued
rights. For example, laws prohibiting non-competes in the
broadcasting sector promote free speech and public access to
news. Restrictions on use in the healthcare sector ensure
availability of medical treatment and providers. Prohibitions
in technology fields promote innovation and knowledge
spillover. However, the decision to protect certain industries
247. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a.
248. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a.
249. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a.
250. Since submission of this Paper, Assemblyman Dinowitz re-introduced the
Bill under A 7193, which currently remains on the Floor Calendar. A. 7193A,
2019 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/
2019/A7193.
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should be left to the individual states that can best determine
how to protect their citizens.
Federal Trade Commission rulemaking would be
consistent with Congress’ goal that the FTC define and
identify “unfair methods of competition.” FTC guidance and
rulemaking relative to NCAs, especially their use in the low
wage sector, could prove very helpful in putting employers
on notice of what constitutes an unfair method of
competition. It would also provide information that is
currently lacking because of the lack of adjudication and
judicial guidance in this area. However, there is no private
cause of action under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
prohibits unfair methods of competition, leaving
enforcement in the hands of the FTC or attorneys general.251
If an employee has the funds and motivation to
commence an action against an employer or defend against
one, case-by-case adjudication can lead to unpredictable
results because judges must apply complex standards and
balancing tests. This results in disparate rulings that make
it difficult for employees to predict whether they will succeed
on the merits. In addition, the expense and protracted nature
of litigation could dissuade employees from commencing
such actions.
4. Legislative Proposal for New York State
Notwithstanding the variety of proposed and active
legislation and initiatives, protections against the improper
use of non-competes in the low wage sector are severely
inadequate in New York State. While there are arguments
that NCAs can lead to more training opportunities,252 many
positions in the low wage sector simply do not involve the
kind of costly training contemplated by employers of highly

251. FTC Act Section 5: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note Overview 7586-7865 (Westlaw) (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
252. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3.
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skilled, educated, and compensated employees. Nor do such
positions involve services that are unique or extraordinary,
trade secrets, or confidential information that would justify
the use of the agreement. In other words, in the low-wage
sector, there is simply no risk of unfair competition sufficient
to warrant the use of NCAs. Any proposed legislation should
prohibit non-competes for low-wage workers while reserving
rights of employers to protect trade secrets, confidential
client information, and investments in innovation and highly
specialized training in other income brackets. The legislation
should clarify that controlling turnover costs is not a
protectable legitimate business interest in any income
bracket.
It is true that permissive use of NCAs is reflective of the
traditional respect for the right to contract. Theoretically, if
the parties agree to an NCA , their contract should indicate
an intent to be bound and a meeting of the minds. However,
the playing field is not always level, particularly for low wage
workers, and the parties do not all have equal negotiating
power. Studies show that the majority of workers presented
with a non-compete do not negotiate the terms of the
agreement.253 Many employees sign non-competes because
they believe the terms are reasonable, assume the terms are
not negotiable, don’t want to create tension with their new
employer, are afraid of being terminated,254 or didn’t think
the agreement would be enforced after taking a new job.255
In most cases, jobs in the lower wage sector come with takeit-or-leave-it terms and are not open to negotiation.256
Evan Starr’s research has also shown that in many
cases, the agreements were not presented until the first day

253. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 19.
254. Id. at 19, 45.
255. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 45.
256. Id. at 19 (61.6% of respondents believed that they had no choice but to
sign and would not have been hired without the non-compete).
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of employment or later.257 When NCAs are not discussed or
disclosed at the interview stage, the lack of transparency
leaves employees at the mercy of the new employer with few
or no good options.258 This failure to disclose could be
tempered by requiring non-competes to be disclosed during
the interview process or no later than at the time of a job
offer. However, such a requirement could be difficult to police
and enforce. Offering a waiting period for a prospective
employee to consider the terms before taking the job is also
a possibility, but this may delay the hiring process for the
employer and could be quite costly when time is lost waiting
to bring a new hire on board. Nevertheless, proposed
legislation should contain a notice provision allowing current
and prospective employees a short time to consider any
rights they may be forfeiting by signing a non-compete.
Even if trade secrets or confidential information and
client lists were involved, New York courts require that
employment restraints be no greater than necessary to
protect the employer’s legitimate interests. It may be
possible to protect such interests by using a more limited
restraint that does not restrict postemployment
opportunities.259 For example, a Confidentiality or
Nondisclosure Agreement, may accomplish the employer’s
objective of preventing the disclosure of confidential and
proprietary information.260 If an employer is concerned with
losing clients, a Non-Solicitation or Nondealing Agreement
might address the issue by prohibiting an employee from
257. Id. at 45 (nearly 30% of respondents were presented with the non-compete
after accepting the job offer).
258. Id. at 18 (26% of those presented with agreement after taking the job
would have thought twice about accepting the position).
259. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1 (discussing use of alternatives to noncompetes in the form of non-solicit, non-poaching, and confidentiality
agreements, as well as garden leave and assignment of invention agreements).
260. Susan M. Heathfield, Confidentiality Agreement, How Does a
Confidentiality Agreement Affect the Employment Relationship?, THE BALANCE
(Jan. 6 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/confidentiality-agreement-1918086.
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soliciting his or her former employer’s clients after taking a
new job.261 Again, this type of agreement would offer
protection to the employer while maintaining the employee’s
freedom of movement.262 Each of these agreements, like noncompetes, must be reasonable in scope, necessary to
legitimate business interests, not harmful to the public and
not unreasonably burdensome on the employee.263
In addition, New York courts allow restraints provided
they do not impose undue hardship on the employee and are
not injurious to the public. Preventing a low wage employee
from working in his or her area of expertise could impose
hardship by forcing the employee to take a position outside
his or her skill set that pays much less. Using the example of
the health care aide, not only would restraining
postemployment opportunities hurt the employee, it would
also injure the community by depriving patients of necessary
medical care. While there is much focus on determining
legitimate business interests, attention should be paid to
employee hardship and injury to the public.
One could argue that since New York is a highly
unenforceable state, or because New York courts are willing
to reform contract terms, there’s no harm in maintaining the
status quo. However, leaving resolution solely to the courts
is an inefficient solution. First, the lack of litigated cases
involving low wage workers indicates that unreasonable and
unenforceable non-competes in the low wage sector are not

261. Jean Murray, Non-Solicitation Agreements in Business Contracts, THE
BALANCE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/non-solicitationagreements-in-business-contracts-398359.
262. The drawback here is that once the agreement is violated, judicial relief
may come too late and the employer may have already suffered a loss. It would
be necessary for employers to move quickly for injunctive relief to mitigate any
losses and demand payment for damages.
263. Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Altair Invests. NA, 59 A.D.3d 97, 102 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008); TBA Global, LLC v. Proscenium Events, LLC, 114 A.D.3d 571, 572
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Transunion Holding Co., 2014 WL
97317, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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being adjudicated in court, in part because employers have
no intention of taking legal action and use the agreements
for their chilling effect. Further, employees lack the funds to
defend against or commence a lawsuit making them inclined
to settlements. Secondly, because New York courts are
willing to reform contract terms, employees will have
difficulty predicting judicial outcomes and determining if
litigation is worth the cost, time, and trouble. Judicial
outcomes are also uncertain because there appears to be
some disagreement in interpreting Post.264 Therefore,
proposed legislation should make clear that NCAs cannot be
used offensively against employees terminated without
cause.265
In sum, proposed legislation should allow businesses to
protect legitimate interests while preserving employment
mobility in the low wage sector. A bill targeting low-wage
and other particularly vulnerable workers could:
(1) give employees leverage to negotiate better wages because they
are not tied to their employer;
(2) allow for wage growth and better benefit packages because more
employees are competing for the same position, which in turn leads
to increased job satisfaction and lower turnover;
(3) protect vulnerable categories of workers, such as school-aged
children, young adults and recent graduates;
(4) prevent employers from failing to disclose non-competes until a

264. See also Greystone Funding Corp. v. Kutner, 137 A.D.3d 427, 427 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2016) (calling attention to opposing holdings Post and Wise); Griffith
Practice Note, supra note 1 (recognizing disagreement by federal courts in
interpreting New York’s position on termination without cause).
265. “The general rule [in New York] is that restrictive covenants may be
enforced against former employees terminated ‘without cause’ provided that the
employer had not materially breached the contract containing the restrictive
covenant and provided the covenant passes the ‘reasonable’ tests traditionally
applied in cases where employees voluntarily quit and engage in forbidden
competitive activities.” Peter L. Altieri & David J. Clark, After Termination
“Without Cause”: Restrictive Covenants, (Feb. 8, 2007), https://www.ebglaw.com/
news/after-termination-without-cause-restrictive-covenants/.
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job offer has been accepted;
(5) prevent employers from using non-competes offensively in
combination with the right to terminate an employee at-will;
(6) place all qualified available candidates in the job pool allowing
employers to hire the best candidate;
(7) increase the availability of experienced workers which allows
employers to avoid paying training costs that they may not recoup;
(8) ensure employees have the freedom to control their professional
careers and improve their personal lives;
(9) encourage judicial efficiency and prevent litigation that
attempts to protect an interest not recognized by New York courts
as a legitimate business interest;
(10) discourage workers from leaving the state to move into other
non-enforcing states;266
(11) reduce the chilling effect that NCAs can have on employees who
are threatened with enforcement and cannot afford or do not wish
to defend a lawsuit;
(12) prevent employers from attempting or threatening to litigate
an agreement that is unenforceable because it does not protect a
legitimate business interest;
(13) reduce the possibility that critical services will be unavailable
to consumers;
(14) reduce or eliminate unjust enrichment resulting from
overcompensation for training costs recouped in full before
termination;
(15) prohibit the enforcement of non-compete agreements against
employees fired without cause;
(16) protect employees by requiring additional consideration for
non-compete agreements required after employment has
commenced;
(17) be consistent with the basic tenets of competition and

266. Although New York is on the lowest end of the enforcement spectrum,
interviewees may not want to risk the possibility of legal action and, instead, may
elect to move to a state that does not enforce non-competes in their sector at all
or has legal protections already in place that guarantee early disclosure.
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capitalism by prohibiting employers from depriving competing
firms of qualified candidates; and
(18) reduce the number of low wage out-of-work employees on public
assistance due to an inability to find suitable employment in their
field.

To that end, the bill I propose for New York is based on
the bills previously introduced in New York State as well as
the recent law passed in Massachusetts. I include what I
consider to be the best provisions of each: (1) prohibiting use
of non-compete agreements for low wage workers as well as
workers under the age of 18, students, and employees
terminated without cause or laid off; (2) establishing notice
and disclosure requirements for all other employees; (3)
defining protectable legitimate business interests that allow
for the protection of trade secrets, confidential information,
and client relationships and unique skills acquired at the
employer’s expenses; (4) providing an enforcement
mechanism under the New York State Department of Labor;
and (5) providing a private cause of action for employees. The
proposed bill and explanatory memorandum follow the
conclusion of this paper.
CONCLUSION
Non-competes can serve a useful purpose in protecting
companies from unfair competition and have a place in
highly skilled and compensated sectors where employees
perform unique services or where the loss of trade secrets,
confidential information, or client relationships are
legitimate business concerns. However, “when entry level
workers at fast food restaurants are asked to sign two-year
non-competes, it becomes less plausible that legitimate
business interests are the primary motivation for such
agreements.”267 Although employees can pursue legal
remedies, they need the resources and motivation to take
267. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 11.
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legal action and must be willing to accept the consequences
of such action on future employment opportunities.
When non-competes are misused, they become a sword
against individual freedom and fair trade, rather than a
shield against unfair competition. “Indeed, our economy is
premised on the competition engendered by the uninhabited
flow of service, talent and ideas.”268 If employers wish to
control the flow of talent by reducing turnover, they should
not rely on an NCA to accomplish that goal. Instead,
employers can offer incentives such as quarterly bonuses and
paid time off to reward longevity and reduce turnover. They
can improve work environments, eliminate hostility, and
promote a culture of mutual respect. Employers should not
be permitted to use NCAs in tandem with at-will
employment or take the easy way out by using non-competes
to tie employees to a job, rather than invest in programs that
encourage employee longevity and loyalty. When used
properly, Nondisclosure and Non-Solicitation Agreements
can protect employers’ legitimate business interests while
promoting fair and free trade, encouraging innovation, and
maintaining respect for low wage earners’ rights to control
their destiny.

268. Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976).
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APPENDIX A. LEGISLATIVE MEMORANDUM FOR PROPOSED BILL

Legislative Memorandum
The following legislation should be introduced to
promote free market competition and employee mobility in
New York State. Non-compete agreements have been used in
employment relationships that do not involve legitimate
business interests recognized by the courts in this State:
protecting trade secrets, confidential client information or
relationships, or unique and specialized skills. This is
evident from detailed study evidence, extensive scholarly
writings, existing case law, and the numerous settlements
obtained by the New York State Attorney General. The
Legislature should take steps to protect employees from the
illegitimate use of non-compete agreements. This proposed
bill can do that.
Employees frequently sign non-competes. The
prevalence of postemployment restraints prevents
businesses from hiring the best possible candidates and
prevents employees from controlling their livelihoods,
improving their lives, and maximizing their talents.
Depriving employees of these choices hurts the economy and
free market competition.
This legislation protects employees from illegitimate
non-compete use while allowing businesses to guard against
unfair competition. It prohibits non-compete agreements for
employees age 18 and under, employees terminated without
cause, students who participate in an internship or other
short-term employment, and low wage workers. In doing so,
the proposed legislation resolves any real or perceived
judicial inconsistency in the state regarding non-compete use
when an employee is terminated without cause.
In addition, in cases where non-compete agreements are
permissible, the proposed legislation creates rules of use,
which require non-competes to be presented in writing
during the interview process and grant candidates time to
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consider the terms of the agreement. If a current employee is
asked to sign a non-compete, he or she will have at least 30
days before the agreement becomes effective and is entitled
to separate consideration independent of continued
employment.
The proposed legislation requires that permissible noncompete agreements be no broader in scope and duration
than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business
interests, which are limited to the protection of trade secrets
and confidential information, protection against the
appropriation of client relationships formed at the
employer’s expense, and protection against competition by a
former employee whose unique and extraordinary skills were
acquired at the employer’s expense.
Finally, the proposed legislation creates an enforcement
mechanism, granting the New York State Commissioner of
Labor the power to investigate and prosecute violations of
law. In the event the commissioner elects not to prosecute a
claim, individual rights to sue are granted. This provision
gives injured employees an administrative remedy that does
not require them to hire counsel and pay attorneys’ fees.
While the proposed bill does not currently include a section
for funding this enforcement mechanism, it is presumed that
the bill is contingent on the legislature adopting language
that provides the funding necessary to carry out this
initiative.
The proposed legislation acknowledges that employees
in some sectors should be protected from non-compete use
altogether and that other employees are entitled to certain
protections regarding the permissible use of non-competes. It
respects the right of employers to protect legitimate business
interests. It will have a positive impact on New York’s
economy by spurring innovation and competition, while
respecting contract rights.
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APPENDIX B. PROPOSED BILL

STATE OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________________
AN ACT to amend the labor law, prohibiting employers
from requiring covered employees to enter into covenants not
to compete and imposing disclosure and consideration
requirements for non-covered employees.
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the
“New York State mobility and opportunity for vulnerable
employees act” or the “NY MOVE act”.
Section 2. The labor law is amended by adding a new article
33 to read as follows:
ARTICLE 33
NEW YORK STATE MOBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY FOR
VULNERABLE EMPLOYEES ACT
Section 950. Definitions.
Section 951. Prohibiting covenants not to compete for Covered
Employees
Section 952. Disclosure requirement for covenants not to compete.
Section 953. Enforcement.
Section 950. Definitions. For purposes of this article, the following
terms shall have the following meanings:
1. “Commerce” has the meaning given such term in section three
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 203).
2. “Covenant not to compete” means an agreement or clause
contained in an employment contract:
(a) between an employee and employer that prohibits or
restricts such employee from performing:
(i) any work for another employer for a specified period
of time;
(ii) any work in a specified geographical area; or
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(iii) work for another employer that is similar to such
employee’s work for the employer included as a party
to the agreement; and
(b) that is entered into after the effective date of this article;
(c) that does not include:
(i) covenants not to solicit employees of the employer;
(ii) covenants not to solicit or transact business with
customers clients, or vendors of the employer;
(iii) noncompetition agreements made in connection with
the sale of a business entity or partnership, or
otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a
business entity or partnership (or division or
subsidiary thereof), when the party restricted by the
noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of,
or member or partner in, the business entity who will
receive significant consideration or benefit from the
sale or disposal;
(iv) noncompetition
agreements
employment relationship;

outside

of

an

(v) nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements;
3. “Covered Employee”:
(a) means
(i) any employee age 18 years or younger;
(ii) any employee who has been laid off or terminated
without cause;
(iii) undergraduate or graduate students who partake in
an internship or other short-term employment
relationship, whether paid or unpaid, while enrolled
in a full-time or part-time undergraduate or graduate
institution;
(iv) any employee who, excluding any overtime
compensation required under section seven of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 207) or
under an applicable state law, receives from the
applicable employer:
(A) an hourly compensation that is less than the
livable hourly rate, as defined in subdivision 5 of
this section, or
(B) an annual compensation that is equal to or less
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than:
1) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this
article, thirty-one thousand two hundred
dollars per year; and
2) for each succeeding fiscal year, the adjusted
amount described in subdivision three of
section nine hundred fifty-one of this article;
and
(b) does not include:
(i) any salaried employee who receives from the
applicable employer compensation that, for two
consecutive months, is greater than:
(A) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this
article, five thousand dollars; and
(B) for each succeeding fiscal year, the adjusted
amount described in subdivision three of section
nine hundred fifty-one of this article.
4. “Employee”, “employer”, “enterprise”, “enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”, and
“goods” have the meanings given such terms in section three of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 203).
5. “Livable hourly rate” means:
(a) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this article, the
greater of:
(i) fifteen dollars per hour; or
(ii) the hourly rate equal to the minimum wage required
by the applicable state or local minimum wage law;
and
(b) for each succeeding fiscal year, the greater of:
(i) the adjusted amount described in subdivision three of
section nine hundred fifty-one of this article; or
(ii) the hourly rate equal to the minimum wage required
by the applicable state or local minimum wage law.
6. “Misappropriation” means:
(a) an act of acquisition of a trade secret of another by a
person who knows or who has reason to know that the
trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(b) an act of disclosure or of use of a trade secret of another
without that person’s express or implied consent by a
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person who
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the
trade secret or
(ii) at the time of the actor’s disclosure or use, knew or
had reason to know that the actor’s knowledge of the
trade secret was
(A) derived from or through a person who had
utilized improper means to acquire it;
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to limit its acquisition, disclosure, or use; or
(C) derived from or through a person who owed a
duty to the person seeking relief to limit its
acquisition, disclosure, or use; or
(iii) before a material change of the actor’s position, knew
or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and
that the actor’s knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident, mistake, or through another person’s act
described in subsections 6(a) or (6)(b)(i) or (ii).
7. “Trade Secret” means specified or specifiable information,
whether or not fixed in tangible form or embodied in any
tangible thing, including but not limited to a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, process,
business strategy, customer list, invention, or scientific,
technical, financial or customer data that
(a) at the time of the alleged misappropriation, provided
economic advantage, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, others who might obtain economic
advantage from its acquisition, disclosure or use; and
(b) at the time of the alleged misappropriation was the
subject of efforts that were reasonable under the
circumstances, which may include reasonable notice, to
protect against it being acquired, disclosed or used
without the consent of the person properly asserting
rights therein or such person’s predecessor in interest.
Section 951. Prohibiting covenants not to compete for Covered
Employees
1. A covenant not to compete shall not be entered into by any
employer with any Covered Employee of such employer, who in
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any work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce (or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce).
2. An employer who employs any Covered Employee, who in any
work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce (or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce), shall
post notice of the provisions of this article in a conspicuous
place on the premises of such employer.
3. (a) For each fiscal year after the fiscal year of the effective date
of this article, the commissioner shall adjust each amount in
effect under
(i) subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of subdivision five
of section nine hundred fifty of this article,
(ii) subsection (2) of clause (B) of subparagraph (iv) of
paragraph (a) of subdivision three of section nine
hundred fifty of this article, or
(iii) clause (A) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of
subdivision three of section nine hundred fifty of this
article for inflation by increasing each such amount,
as in effect for the preceding fiscal year, by the annual
percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (United
States city average, all items, not seasonally
adjusted), or its successor publication, as determined
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(b) The amounts adjusted under paragraph (a) of this
subdivision shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of
$0.05.
Section 952. Disclosure requirement for covenants not to compete.
In order for an employer to require an employee, who in any work
week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
(or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce) and is not a Covered Employee, to
enter into a covenant not to compete, the covenant must meet the
following requirements:
(a) It shall be provided to a prospective employee by the
earlier of a formal offer of employment or thirty days
before the non-compete -agreement goes into effect.
(b) It shall be provided to a current employee:
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(i) at least thirty days before the agreement becomes
effective and
(ii) be supported by fair and reasonable consideration
independent from continued employment;
(c) It shall be in writing and signed by the employer and
employee;
(d) It shall expressly state that the employee has the right to
consult with counsel prior to signing.
(e) It must be no broader in scope and duration than
necessary to protect one or more of the following limited
legitimate business interests:
(i) the employer’s trade secrets;
(ii) the employer’s confidential information
otherwise would not qualify as a trade secret;

that

(iii) the appropriation of clients serviced by a former
employee where the relationship was created and
maintained at the employer’s expense;
(iv) competition by a former employee whose services are
unique or extraordinary and whose unique and
extraordinary skills were acquired at the employer’s
expense;
(f) It must not impose an undue hardship on the employee;
(g) It must not be injurious to the public;
Section 953. Enforcement.
1. The commissioner of labor shall have the power to receive,
investigate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a complaint of a
violation of sections nine hundred fifty-one and nine hundred
fifty-two of this article, subject to subdivision two of this
section.
2. (a) The commissioner shall impose a civil fine:
(i) on any employer who violates subdivision one of
section nine hundred fifty-one or section nine
hundred fifty-two of this article, an amount not to
exceed five thousand dollars for each employee who
was the subject of such violation; and
(ii) with respect to any employer who violates
subdivision two of section nine hundred fifty-one of
this article, an amount not to exceed five thousand
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dollars.
(b) In determining the amount of any civil fine under this
section, the commissioner shall consider the
appropriateness of the fine to the size of the employer
subject to such fine and the gravity of the applicable
violation.
3. (a) In the event the commissioner elects not to enforce a
complaint of a violation of sections nine hundred fifty-one and
nine hundred fifty-two of this article, an employee, including a
Covered Employee, may bring a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction against any employer or persons alleged
to have violated this section.
(b) An employee shall bring such action within two years of
the later of:
(i) when the prohibited non-compete agreement was
signed;
(ii) when the employee learns of the prohibited noncompete agreement;
(iii) when the employment relationship is terminated; or
(iv) when the employer takes any step to enforce the noncompete agreement.
(c) The court shall have jurisdiction to void any such noncompete agreement and to order all appropriate relief,
including enjoining the conduct of any person or
employer; ordering payment of liquidated damages; and
awarding lost compensation, damages, reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs.
(d) For the purposes of this subdivision, liquidated damages
shall be calculated as an amount not more than ten
thousand dollars. The court shall award liquidated
damages to every employee affected under this section, in
addition to any other remedies permitted by this section.
(e) The court shall also award a consideration payment if the
employer did not provide such payment when due.
4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to employees
covered under section two hundred two-k of this chapter.

Section 3. Severability clause. If any clause, sentence,
paragraph, subdivision, section or part of this act shall be
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adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid,
such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the
remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to
the clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or part
thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such
judgment shall have been rendered. It is hereby declared to
be the intent of the legislature that this act would have been
enacted even if such invalid provisions had not been included
herein.
Section 4. This act shall take effect immediately and shall
apply to employees hired on and after such date.

